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CHAPTER I
UOW STANDS THE UNION?

o_ur Feder~ Union -- It E.~ be .P.r.es~~d ..
Andrevr Jackson

The Union -- next to our liberty most dear.

May we always remember it can only be preserved by
distributing equally the benefits and the burdens
of the Union~
·.
1
John c. Calhoun

The above to<:J.st s, g:lven on an evening set aside to honor the
memory of Thomas Jeffersor•, dramatized the stances, the strategies,
the ideas and the ideals taken by two major American political
figures, the President and the Vice President of the United Stateso
Probably fe. ., present at the banquet on AprH 13, 1830 were able to
escape the tension and the pov1er developed by the cordiality of
the eighty toasts offered that

even:tng~

Jvlutual forbearance and reciprocal concessions:

11

their agency the Un:i.on 'Has establishedo

The patriotic

l·Thich they emanated will eve.r sustain. it .. 112

through·
spirH from

Hartin Van Buren's

---,.,-·--·--L Glyndon G., VanDeusen, The Jacksonian Er::t (New York:
Harper Torch books, 1959), pp. 44, --z;~~r:----·---2 .. Charles M~ Hiltse, ~o~m .f.'!_CaJ.h~un_;___L~JJi~J:.£!::.t.J·8~9-39
(IndianapoHs: The Bobbs-Ner.n_ll Company, Inc., 191~9), Po 71.

2

toast completes for us the ideology reflected .in the early 1830's.
~~ithin

the American political framevmrk, Van Buren suggests the

means by which consensus and conflict, any faction, could be resolved
by forbearance and reciprocal concessionso

Th~se

twenty-fifth,

twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh toasts leave an imprint upon the
political process and the manner of politics in America.
The rhetoric and the individuals symbolize the differing
philosophical positions and processes w·hich each advocated how
American politics ought to functiono
responding to a situation.

Thus each provided a strategy for

This rhetoric incorporated varying aspects

of the philosophy of the Great Philosopher, Thomas Jefferson, with
each individual claiming to be a follower of Jefferson.

3

As new

dilemmas presented themselves, the inherited political phUosophy
was employed for strategic responses..

This philosophy was held to-

gether by an intricate series of interlocking and balanced polarities

4

by men who found themselves in the same political party but representing divergent positionso

The unity began to disintegrate as the vary-

ing strategies were applied to the different situations, e.g., the
Jefferson Nemorial dinner of 1830.

The holders of the divergent

stances, particularly Jackson and Calhoun, all attempted a return to
Thomas Jefferson, he who had fragmented the early Federal. consensus
by founding an institutionalized loyal opposition but yet who had
the effrontery v1hen himself elected president of the people to construct

3 ... Jackson built on Jefferson's theme of democracy and equality
of the people \'lhile Calhoun turned to his expression on state rights
and representation of miriorities~
4 .. Polarity here meaning any tendency to turn, grow, think,

feel, etc .. , in a certain 'tray, as if because of magnetic attraction

or repuTsion.,

3

a new consensus by proclaiming
.
5
Federalists!"

11

He are all Republicans, we are all

What eventuated from the polarities \'ras not so much an
-alteration of ;Jefferson 1 s belief system as i t \'las an explosion
of that system.

The preliminary sparks were ignited in 1828-1833

with the tariff issues; the full impact was felt in the 1860's,
even in the 1960's.

6

The situation at point of impact reveals both

those forces integrating ne1'1' values and those resi.sting change.
Jacksonian Era represents an encounter of

pori~cal

The

consensus and

political conflict at a point of rapid change.
Tb¢ essential problems of politics are ancient, general,
and persistent..

A pa1·ticular political

sy~tem 1

such as that of the

United States, can be interpreted as a way of coping >'lith recurring
problems.

Some of the vmys a political system deals -v1ith problems

may be unique, some commonplace.,

Because it meets its problems :tn a

particular· time and. place \·lith a special .body of past experiences to
go on·, each political system is unique; so too the American system
is unique.

But because some problems have recurred ever since

civilized men have tried to live together, every polit:ical system
has had to deal "VTith enduring dilemmas.
the basic questions are not.

Its solutions may be unique,

The focus of this paper is directed

toward one particular problem -- the issue of conflict and consensus,
political power and political order~ in a changing democratic soci.ety
>{j_th politics seen as the means whereby the community balances the

.. So Jacob Richards, .Me.ssages..~nd~ers of the _Presi.den.t ~ 17.89_.. 1.817,
L (Washington: Government Printing Office, H196), 322.

_6., New values -vrere introduced not because they ,.,ere missing in
the original philosophy but because they had not been accentuated in
t_hat particular \my in the system ..

t.~nsion

between conflict and consensus.

The American ancestors chose

to live in a conununity, ''lith its numerous and obvious advantages.

But,

when strong human beings seek the company of one another, conflict
seems to be an inescapable aspect of conununity and hence of the human
condition.

While conflict has been the focus of attention by many

-~

philosophers, historians, social scientists, Aristotle, Hachiavelli,
Locke -- it is James Madison ,.;ho perhaps more than any other single
individual gave shape to Amerlcan conflict in his modeling the
American constitutional system.

He held that conflict is built in-

to the very nature of man, and thus a system must be devised through
which it is channeled and controlled.

Conflict and consensus, among

other things, involve the interaction of power, ordert liberty, and
flexibility.

It is to the Age of Jackson and the poli.Hcal philos··

ophies promulgated by the founding fathers, that this research turns
to gain an insight into how
in the United States -- to
.£Oli.tical pat.terns of the

11

factionsu are channeled and controlled

~n

insight

in~~-f!Sic P.~uralistic

Utl.i_!.e~~~e

Politics, as a process of social-conflict regulation, is
inseparable from human associatione

The form and behavior of the

political pmce;;s, ho-vrever, varies considerably from community to
community.

These differences are traceable to variations in social

relations, constitutional arrangements, and personal orientations.
In Amer:l.ca, social conflict is resolved, or put aside, -.,qhen
institutions make binding (legitimate) conununity policy concerning
a dispute.

In the c01mnunity this need not mean definitive settle-

ment of the controversy; rather, conflict resolution implies a

5

method sufficiently moderating social tensions in order to avoid
destructive competition.

In the process new conflicts may l-7ell be

created, if the outcome of policy controversies is disputed.

Thus,

as a means of reconciling opposing forces, politics aims at a modus
vivendi that keeps social disputes

~vithin

the boundaries of co-

operative-competitive relations.
If conflict resolution is to produce effective community
policy, .citizens must be 'villing to accept community decisions as
Q.inding.

In a word, they must frame some medium of consensuso

Legitimate policies are those people accept, obey..

Sources of this

feeling of legitimacy may originate from fear and use of force or
from consent..

Force does not always produce compliance; if the

desire to disobey offsets any penalties, force is of limited
effectiveness..
us that.

If the 1960 1 s taught us anyth:i.ng, surely they taught

Consent derives from an understanding between citizens and

officials, given \'There people agree to being governed under specified
rules and conditions.

To gain obedience, the possibility .of personal

reward is substituted for· the threat of personal deprivation.
Government by consent rests on agreement between governors
and gover-ned, and it consists of both written and unwritten rules
and procedures for regulating social confl:i.cto

It is manifested

ln traditions, habit, political doctrines, institutions, and
ceremonies..

Its existence signifi.es a law or treaty bet\•reen dis-

puting interests to preserve comrnuni.ty association despite pursuit
of less inclusive claims.

This is not to say that all such rules

and procedures are beyond change;

many become the subje.ct of hot

6

dispute.

When constitutional conflicts do occur, they normally re-

fleet the efforts of newly emergent interests or those opposing
change.
Within the frame\>rork of legi.timacy provided by accepted
constitutional arrangements for adjusting disputes, interests influence community policy-making.
ciprocal relations that exist

~·Then

By influence is meant the rean individual or group, in

accordance with his interest, induces another to modify his behavior despite desires to the contrary.
Maurice Duverger ident:i.fies an institution a·s "clusters
of ideas and beliefs, usage and ways of behavior, and material
things ...... which· form a co-ordinated and organized l-7hole .. 117

Patterns

deri.ved from such activity produce a particularly stable character
from the association of clusters of ideas and beliefs, traditions,
conventions, and laws popularly accepted as

legitimate~

Here

~1e

are interested in the political institutions and political processes

~1hich

contri.bute noticeably to social-conflict regulation for the

entire corrununity and the patterns of regulations, e.g., bargai.ning,
competition, ·persuasion, end command ..
In the United States, conflict resolution consists of patterns
. of behavior by w·hi.ch social conflict is represented and resolved.,
Representatlon is a process of communication which makes the conflict
knmm through patterns of partidpation, opinion, leadership, choice,
partisanship, and pressure.

7.
(New York:

Resolution is a process of accommodation

Maurice Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sd.ences
Frederick A.. Praeger;-1960, Po 233.

7
tpat keeps conflict within manageable limits through policy-making.
Officials make binding public policy with acts of formulation,
adaptation, application, and adjudication..

Politics occurs "lith-

in a community marked by social diversity, variable doctrinal and
policy disagreement but within a poHtical··constitutional consensuse
The style of conflict regulation is a blend of competit:l.on, bargaining, persuasions, and commando

The precise mixture contributes to

the democratic character of the political community..

The Jacksonian

Era provides an excellent period :i.n American political history to
observe the precise mixture of American democratic character, the
variety of democratic models, and their responses to change within
a consensus.
Given the diversity of American society, the problem of
f~ctions,

conflict, change, and the problem of consent are particular··

ly thorny and complex in the period just mentioned..

Until recently,

little had been done in the United States to formulate systematic
theoretical defense of political pluralism.

So secure and "natural"

were the pluralistic foundations of government t.hat they could be
accepted as the axiomatic point of departure for political pract:i.ce
and public discoursed

Alexis de Tocqueville 1 s reflection of self-

governing "intermediate bodies" capable of counterva:l.ling both an
atomistic and a totalitarian state became an exclusive basis for
public philosophy..
no~matively

It seemed to be at once descriptively accurate,

desirable, and analytically fruitful..

Recent research

has provided extensive empirical and descriptive literature crystallized
around a more systematic approach to the interaction between party
politics, group politics, and bureaucratic politics in the United States

8
and in the comparative analysis of political systems.

The scope of

these pluralistic studies i.ncludes the various forms of institutional
'

.

federalism, the functioning of the party system, formal devices for
group representation, and decentralization of electoral apportionment, legislative organization, the administrative machinery of
government, and informal processes of group pressure and influence
upon public opinion formation, elections, legislative, chief
executive, administrative agencies, an'd courts.

Thus political

pluralism focttses upon the relationship of geography and social
organizations to governmental structures and process of .policy
formation.
This analysis of pluralism is an attempt to illuminate how
the fabric of United States politics consists of recurrent attempts
to reconcile the diverse yearnings of individual citizens with the
. '

transcendent ··desire to live together as Americans.

The intent is

to move into and behind the rhetoric, to the situation, and the
strategies used to respond to the situation; to obeerve the conflict and the processes used to dispel or resolve the conflicto
The central focus of this analysis is the political process of
pluralism, more pred.sely, pluralism as a consistent tenet in the
political rhetoric and political action of John Ce Calhoun.

No political party looks back to Calhoun as its founder
·or. rejuvenator, no group of public men proclaim allegiance

to his doctrines, no considerable group of individuals
outside of South CaroHna profess any love for his name and
8
ideals.

Historian William Ec Dodd was correct in his observation

8 .. Hilliam E .. Dodd, .stc:~.£~~E..._<~!~ Old South, or From

Radic31lism to C:onservative Revolt. (New York:

Nacmillan

Co,.

1

1911), p. 91.

9

in 1911 that John

c.

Calhoun's political philosophy was rejected as

a result of the Civil War though he since has beeri revived as a reputable
figure in American political philosophy.

There remains the question

if major threads of American political doctrine is part of Calhoun's
action and thoughto

From de Tocqueville through Max Lerner and

Louis Hartz to Robert Dahl pluralism has been considered a basic
theme in American politics.

Were Calhoun 1 s political philosophy

~~~~~~------'and_a_e_t_LQD_'\tar_fant._s_o_f_hasic_Amer_ican_plural:Lsm?_If_basic_entitiel'l

_______

of pluralism are present, what torere possible ramifications from his
elaboration? e.g., to >'lhat lengths may opposition be safely carried
before it ceases to be a right and becomes an abus·e?

What '\'7ere

possible relationships between the theory and fact of pluralism
the use of each to justify the others.

Of course, comprehension

of Calhoun's political behavior and philosophy can not be made
without consideration of his major political contemporary Andrew
Jackson, Jackson's political style .and political rhetoric.

From

the interaction of these two great political leaders the strategies
and responees of Calhoun become clearer.
T-his research is based on the hypothesis that the interaction
of rhetoric and practical political activities. of JOhn C.. Calhoun
with Andrew Jackson concerning the tariff issue reveals basic strands
of political pluralism.

Calhoun's political theories, subtle, even

profound though they may have been, were reduced to absurdity and
irrelevance by the Civil

Har~

But the

J?ro~~

which was basic to

this thinking and action reverberates in a variety of forms basic
to American political thought..

Some students of Calhoun contend

that his basic principle has become the organizing principle

10

of American politics,

11

that every major interest in the country, whether

regional, economic or religious, is to possess a veto or political
decision directly affecting it - rule of concurrent majority.u

9

G.alhounts conception of political order, which he framed in
terms of a realistic appraisal of human nature and the social
structure of classes and regions, constitutes a claim to contemporary
attention l·TOrthy of evaluation.
sectionalism and the realities of

Calhoun's analysis of American
class_s_t_r_uggl~_no_t_o_nly~anticipate _____~

most social thought of a modern stamp, but is directed by him to
shm-Ting the mutual dependence of the political and social order.
Calhoun, perhaps alone, saw in it (sectional and interest pluralism) more than a rule of expedience, imposed by the country's size
and justifiable by results, H at
ciple of free government.,

all~

He saw in it a basic prin-

Calhoun posits a .relation and a distj.nc·· ·

tion ~1hich at once extended the function of go,,ernment beyond the
negative regulation of human behavior to the positive organization
of social interests .. · The same distinction and relation requires
that government accept and work with whatever groups or classes exist
or may be generated in the social order.
His suggestions, although deviating in pa1:t from the
American trends of his time, may offer ba.sic ideas toward the
solution of the problem of minority relations today.

These ideas

have a two-f:old contemporary pertinence.,

consti~ute

First, they

l! subtle and profound statement of the major issues perta:l.ning

9.~ TNo approaches are offered by:
Peter Druclwr, ttA Key
to American Politics: Calhoun 1 s Plu:cal:i.sm 7 11 1'l~~-L{ev5.e>-! of: Politics, X
(October, 1948), 412-LJ.26; and, John Fischer, "Unwritten Rules of
P,.merican Politics," Ha~~P.~' 197(Novernber,19Lf8), 27-36Q

1J.

to political organization of·minority groups.

Calhoun's experience

of the problem of conflict was immediate and he had the analytical
mind needed to formulate his experience.

John Tyler commented:

"Calhoun's mind has been likened to a lens, for its po't'Ter to bring
to a focus diverging rays of light., 1110

Second these ideas clearly

uncover the root issue in minority relations, which is holding a
balance between freedom and responsible action.

If Calhoun was

.__________~t~o~e___Rilling_to_sacr._ifi.ce_freedom-to-secur-ity-unde-t._the-p!'essul"'e--------of impending conflict, this, of

itself~ is a lesson for today. 11

·Consideration will be given to three levels of Calhoun's
political ideas:

1,. political program and political nctions,

2. descriptive interpretation of the political system,
3. prescriptive theory.
Heans of moving into Calhoun and his time and to the process of
plu~alism ~qill be by focusi.ng upon a particular situation Hith which

he was confronted, the Tariff of Abomination, 'I'Thich reveals his
strategic responses as well as those of Andre"" Jackson.,

Also re-

vealed are the ambiguities and conflicts resulting from the
politicians having the same philosophic mentore

t't'lO

After develop-

ing the situation and developing pluralism as a basfc American
political process, the analysis will move to the interaction

--------10. Wiltse,

op~

cit., p. 128.

ll.. Today is not the focus of this wo:clc.
his time areo

Calhoun and

12

of.President Jackson and Vice President Calhoun; through their
rhetoric and their actions, insight into the functions and dysfunctions of American political pluralism can be gained.
This work does not encompass the \-7hole of Jackson nor
Calhoun, the whole of pluralism nor any other political model
which might be used to describe a political style.
to show:

distinct differences

It is only

existed in the political style

projected by these two political leaders; pluralism existed as
a basic process in part of Calhoun's actions and thoughts;

the

pluralist model of Calhoun was used to resist change by a minority group "1hich may be a major function served by the negative
pluralistic tradition as well as it being seen as a stablizing
factor in America's political pattern.
The choice of a historical study may be seen by modern
analysts as vague, diffuse, outmoded in an era of percision and
tight conceptualizatione

But historical studies can serve as a

laboratory for consideration of political forms.

Such studies

have the potential and probability of relationships of ideas
and politics by providing a broad and external insight into a
situation, >•7hich is lacking in contemporary studies.

Also this

type of analysis gives a more complete contextual .frame\-TOrk with
the advantage of data collecting activities.

Robert HcCloskey

contended that American political philosophy "performs an important
'reflective' function," in that it truly "mirrors the thought of

13

tl_le nation."

12

An analysis of selected prescriptive theories closely
a~sociated

with the institutional realities of American politics .

provide means for exploring a number of the theoretical questions
raised by the workings of our constitutional machinery.

For example,

do the institutions and suppor,ting att:i.tudes of our pluralist.: politics
function. to. deny to the amcept of citizenship a corresponding

interest that, rather than uniting men, divides them?

A portion

of American political thought shm·rs the anmver to be "yes."

While

analysis of the political thought of others, such as John Adams
or James Hadison, whose institutional handiwork is thought to
be closely associated with the pluralist thrust in our politics,
might support this view, special consideration suggests the
appropriateness of the action and thought of Calhoun as a focus
for study in this context.

For Calhoun is hailed by many as one

of the great men in the American conservative tradition, and thus his
thought and action has the added inducement of the "hard caseo 11

For

example, one \·lOuld not expect to find present in the organic and
conservative theory of community advanced by Calhoun such critical
ambiguities touching upon the location of membership status in the
whole and the identification of a unifying interest as are likely
to be found in the procedural theory of order founded upon the
Liberal flight from community.

Yet the frequent identification of

12. Robert HcCioskey, "American Political Thought and the
Study of Politics, 11 ~£tes to the Sttlj;z__?f Politics, ed. Robert
Young (Evanston·, Illinois: Nortlnvestern University Press,. 1962), Po 157.

14

Calhoun's theory with the institutions and practices of pluralist
politics, coupled "'ith McCloskey's premise, \oTould lead us to expect
that if we were to look hard enough, these same·shortcomings would
be found embodied in Calhoun's system.
The study of political thought through history can contribute
t.-o the tasks of political science by:

development of theory and its

conceptual and propositional components, and the testing of theory
about ioeas; and tl1eClescription· and explanation ofthe polTtical
culture (here being an interest iri. the kind of theory that generalizes
about the interrelated epxectations of the world -- empirical theory).
It- is through theory that our observatj.ons become more than
mere gathering of facts; it tells us t;here to go for evldence and
what to expect when we get there.

As it provides a framework for

linking one set of observations to another, it provides the means
through whi.ch our experience, \'lith the past becomes a basis for
expectati.ons of the future.

CHAPTER II

PLURALISM:

THE METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Liberalism is a system of Pluralism. It is a system of
many centers of pm-rer, many areas of privacy and a strong
internal impulse tm·1ards the mutual adaptation of spheres,
rather than of the dominances or the submission of any one
t,o___r_he_o_th_er_,.________~--------------~--------E. A•. Shils

c _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Pluralism as defined in the Oxford Universi.ty Dictionarz is
a system of thought which recognizes more than one ultimate principle.
It became part of the vernacular in England in 1887 as a term used in
opposition to monism.

Pluralists define the typical state as one

within 'iThich public authority will be properly delegated to a
plurality of groups.

Thus, as a way of ordering and explaining life,

pluralism has been at the heart of classic liberal ideology of the
Western world, best exemplified in the above quote by E.

A~

Shils ..

Political pluralism has had an honorable lineage, as well
as an impressive array of contemporary supporters..

Traces of

political pluralism can be found in Ari.stotle in the Fourth Century
B.

c.,

Althusius in the Sixteenth Century A. D., and more recently in

the works of Hegel_and John Stuart Mill.,

Such distinguished American

pqli.tical scientists as Arthur Bentley in Process of Government,

L. E., A. Shils, !_he T_?2:!!_l~?f Secre:z (J~ondon:
1956)' p., 154.

2$
1955),

p ..

O~ford Univ~rsity Dic!~2

1528.

(Oxford:

Heinemann,

Clarendon Press,

2

16

Pendleton Herri11g in The Politics of Democra.E.X,, E. E. Schattschneider
in The Semisovereign People, V.
Group~,

o.

Key in Politics, Parties and Pressure

and David Truman in The Governmental Process, have contributed

to the understanding of the process of polit:!.cal pluralism.
In the context of political thought and the political process,
the concept pluralism refers to a specific institutional and behavioral
arrangement for distributing and sharing governmental po-v1er, to the
doctri.nal defense of these arrangements and to an approach for gaining
understanding of political behavior.

Therefore, it is a historical

phenomena, .a normative doctrine, and a mode of

analysis~

It en-

compasses the vie>v that political, social, and cultural systems
are constructed from a rm.tltiplicity of autonomous but independent .
groups or may be interpreted in terms of a multiplicity of factors.
It may also ;_nclude the claim that the multiplicity is morally valued,
and good.
It is important here to distinguish between plural:i.sm as

a social doctrine and the term pluralist in a descriptive sense.
The former was expounded primarily by English thinkers at the beginning of this century to counter the theory of state sovereignty,
which holds that the state exists as the preeminent institution of
society and determines values and conunands personal loyalty.

Plural-

ists urge instead that any society is composed of a multipl:i.city of
independent groups, each of 1o1hich should be permitted to contribute
to the formation of individual values and social policy.

The state,

viewed as only one group among many, has no final word or personal
or social preferenceso

The pluralists' concern with the existence

of a variety of social groups emphasizes the fact that multiple

17
a,.:f.:filiations contribute to the basis for politics.

Through

multiple group membership they see the basis for the stability
of a democratic society.

A society designated as pluralisitic is

marked by the existence and social acceptance of many "autonomous
centers of decision-making authorityt" reflecting a diversity of
desires that promote varied interests and

s~cial

conflicts.

3

In

this sense, America has been viewed as pluralistic, in both its
social and political (constit\.ltional) dimensions of conununity life.
J:?or example, the organization of popular demands upon governmental
officials has been considered markedly pluralistic.

Pluralistic

societies possess an intermedlate layer of stable, organized group
life lying

bet~;een

the family and community authority; thus, these

independent groups are said to constitute a backbone for socially
diverse America and give rise both to complementary and incompatible
interests.

4 Tensions ~mong groups render it difficult for any single

association to control the whole policy-making apparatus.

The fact

that one person may belong to many groups limits any one group's
influence;;

Thus groups compete for an individual's loyalties, but

encounter trouble in influencing more than a limited arHa of an
individual's behavior.

Single groups thereby have difficulty domi-

nating not only the governmental process of the community but also
the behavior of their o-vm membership.

5

H_enry Kariel has given six genera.l propositions intregal

3, Dan Nimmo and Thomas D. Ungs, American Political Patterns·
(Boston:

Little, Brmm and Company, 196 7), Po 22. -

4. Ibid., p. 26.
5~ Henry K.'3.r5.el, "Pluralism," Intm:national EncycJ.oEedi<?:_
of Social Sciences (1967), XII, 164.
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to the study of pluralism:
L. Individual fulfillment is assured by small governmental
units, for they alone are representative;
2~ the unrepresentative exercise of governmental power is
f-rustrated 'vhen public.agencies are geogr·aphicnlly dispersed;

3... society is composed of a variety of reasonable independent
(but overlapping) religious, cultural, educational, professional
and economic associations;
L.,__. these private associations are voluntary insofar as
no individual is ever 'l'rholly affiliated with anyone of them;
---~--------5.,_p:ub~-ic-po-1-:i.c~-aGGeJ.3~Cd-as-b1ondi:ng-on-a-l-l-a-ssoci"q:tions

is the result of their own free interaction;
6-.. public governine.nt is obliged to discern and act only
6
upon the common denomination of group concurrence.

T,he type of interaction described invohres multiple centers of political
povrer; thus, federalism, checks and balances, and t'he role of majority
and minorities become central issues of political pluralism.
H.odern pluralist states ax:e seen as dividing their central
authority between two spheres, one .which is fixed and one that is
removable.

The fixed portion (constitutions or other symbols) hold

the loyalty, respect and affection of the people, whereas their inevitable hostilities and discontent can be directed against the
removable parts (e.g. presidents, congress, interchangeable parties).
In this way change, rebell:i.on, conflict, is licensed and waged more
or less peacefully through elections, the alternative of political
parties and leaders.

7

The public realm becomes one in 'vhi.ch

co·~

existing groups naturally complement one another and the role of

6; Ibid., p. 165.

7-. Robert C., North, Ho,mrd E.. Koch, Jr., and Dina A.. Zinnes,
The Integrat:i.ve Functions of Conflict, 11 Jo~_of~ Conflict Resolution, IV
(September: 1960.), 366.

11
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government is diminished, as it tries· to establish or preserve equilibrium,
or, at least, control conflict that would be distructive to the system
as a whole.

Pluralist's theory of balance requires that power be

distributed to many units.
One of the most palpable facts of life in society (particular ...
ly large societies) is that most resources are generally unevenly
distributed in different patterns to different groups and individuals.
The interaction tends to create majority(ties) and minor:i:ty(ies) in
terms of conflict representation, as well as different levels of
intensity of concern for issues.

The issue of intensity vms relevant

in the distinct responses to the tariff in 1816 as opposed to the response in 1828.

The concern for the type of interaction, and the power

and influence involved, has become a central issue in American political
thought, as a democratic political system,.
Another major question arising from pluralisU.c political
patterns is:
protection?

Is there any particular minority entitled to special

What occurs whenmajorities shift or economically privileged

start losing their power?

1~e

a core issue for The Federal:i.st

role and interaction of .factions become
Pape~s,

the Constitution, and its

impact on the role of change as seen during the Jacksonian Era is
significant.

Calhoun drew heavily on the apove documents, as well

as the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.
It is a great and inescapable defect in any system of
rule by majorities tha.t on the questions in which the policy
of a minor:i.ty conflicts with the policy preferred by a majority' 8
neither can prevail without frustrating the desires of the others ..

8. Robert Dahl, Pluralist Demc_:~_£acy in the United
(ChicagQ: Rand McNally & Company";, 196 7), p. 180 ..

St~~
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~!hat

type of process did Calhoun use to respond to the change in

economic and political conditions?

What alternative constructs did

he perceive and use?
Pluralistic political'patterns are designed to increase the
levels through which an individual or group may enter the political
arena and plead his (its) case, as \•Tell as limiting the degree of
power which any one group or individual may hold.

Governmental

patterns divide conflict regulation among multiple a.nd often
conflicting centers.

The federal system and separation of pov;ers

provide minorities (Calhoun and the South) a variety of approaches
for influencing or controlling pm-1er.

The presence of semi-autonomous

clusters of community officials make i.t possible for groups to travel
a variety of routes in an attempt to make their i.nfluence felt on
public pc.licy.

If one set of governing officials is inaccessible,

perhaps another may be open for presentation of interest demands.
In a pluralistic society many grrupsalso tend to be so specialized
that they cannot spread their influence over all policy-makers.
Specialization though may make it easier for officials to possess
autonomy in their mm policy areas.

But the

11

checks and balances 11

scheme was formalized in the Constitution by separating policymakers into institutions possessing overlapping jurisdictions, yet
not dependent upon one another for their authority.
distribution of authority \•ras to distribute power.

A major reason
A pluralist

society does need a pluralistic constitutional character to match,
in order to be functionally viable •

.At the core of the pluralist vision are a number of perspectives
that point l.n the direction of both the des:i.rability and the possibility
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of a mechanistically sustained non-directive political society.

One

such perspective may be characterized by possessive individualism:
the view of man as "essentially the proprietor of his own person,"
or capacities, o\'ling nothing to society for them.
morally

complete~

9

Nan is born

capable of possessing purpose indpendent of

the rights and obligations of specific membership statutes.
is a

self~conta.ined

He

fact in a na.tural universe that functions as

well as an end in itselfG

11

An o-vmer of himself," his rights are

-------------------------------------------------- ---------------~----------------------------1!0'
1
•
J.V-

founded in natura

necessitY~

In this light it is significant that John Cc Calhoun, if
l! pluralist, should view· man's preoccupation with self-interest as

a fact legitimated by "the great lavT of self-preservation, which
prevades all that feels.1111 The naturalist-founded assertion of man's
moral completeness and the subsequent validation of man's desire
to better his condition recommends the appropriateness of l:i.berty,
as it "leaves each free to pursue the course he may deem best to
promote his interest and happiness .. 1112

Since there is no special

context in which men must participate in order to acquire interest
or purpose, neither are there any external standards to which men
can repair for the purpose of authenticating or invalidating one
another's interest objectively.

Possessive individualism promises

9. Co B. NacPhersoh, Jhe POlit!_cal Theory, <?LP?ssessive
Individualism: _Hobbes t:£._Locke (London: Oxford University Press,

l962)J Pc 3~

10. Ibid.
11. J. Co Calhoun, ~-~isquisit!_on on Govc:2~~~~' ed., CQ
Gordon Post (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 5 ..

12.

Ibid~,

p. 40.
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liberty on the assertion that purpose or interest is a part of the
person in the same way an arm is an extention of the body; an indi. h t to l'b
v idua 1 h as a n.g
~ erty b eyon d t h e

po~-1er

. d ge. 13
o f· ot h ers to JU

Ultimately, rights and l:i.berties are viewed as implicit in the

11

capa-

•
.
. .. 1,l4.
bili. tLes
an d nee d s to equa 11y se lf -mov~ng
mec h an1.sm
Rooting liberty, however, in the naturalism of the possessive
individualist premise, leads inevitably to tw·o problems:
the problem of order, the other is pov.1er.,

one l.s

These are both important

organizing perspectives occupying a central·place in the pluralist
vision.

Because of the lack of mutual dependence among possessive

men, there is little likelihood that order will spontaneously assert
itself.

Order can hardly be expected to grow out of the harmony of

interest that is obta:!.ned

~·Then

men acquire their purposes from

membership statuses in a connnon corporative system.

In such a system

the acquisition and legitimation of interest proceeds independently
from such a system's existence.

Therefore, insitutions serve only as

the carriers of a universal reason implementing a unifying morality.
Given the dissociated character of possessive men, they are, in this
sense, "individuals;"

it is unlikely that order v.Till be organically

mediated bythe ends men pursue in the light of the purposes they
are educated to chose.
The problem of order is compounded by yet another perspective'
irt the pluralist vision; let us call it the psychology of roan the
observable actor.

In thls perspective it is suggested that

1.3. Sheldon Holin, Polj.t.!_~d
Brm·m, and Company, 1960), pp. 331-342.

'~Js:i.5?!!

1.4. MacPherson, op., cit., pp. 78-79 •.

(Boston:

'ivhile

11

Little,
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man is created for the social state ••• his direct or .individual·
affections are stronger than his sympathetic or social feelings."
Calhoun's argument here was not that men are wicked.
ed for society," he

15

"Man is creat-

is accordingly so formed as to feel what
.
16
affects others as well as what affects himself."
It is only
11

that self-regarding feelings are perhaps more universal and more
reliable in their operation than are other-regarding ones.

The

________point of the psychology is not to pass judgment on "hwnan__n_a_t1it'_e_,._"______~~
not to show why man is either good or evil.

Rather the intent is to

isolate those natural factors most likely to influence behavior.
~

What one encounters in the pluralist vision is not a normatively
evaluative theory of "human nature" but rather an analytically
selective and functionally relevant psychology.

17

If, as we shall

see, this psychology is of instrumental value to the solution of
the problem of order, it adds nonetheless to the problem's urgency
by dramatizing certain behavioral propensities in man.

If the

possessive premise darkens the prospectfor natural harmony of
interest among men, the psychology would seem to discourage faith in
the ability of men independently to qualify their purposes. so as to
insure that their actions harmonize '·lith the interest of others.
Order, to obtain, must be consciously concerted.

Yet hovT can

order be concerted if there are no object5.ve standards pennitting men

rS .. Calhoun, op. c:l.t., p .. 4.
16. Ibid.
17. John Schaar, "Some Hays of Thinking About Equality,u
.J.o11rnal of PolitJ:~, X.X..'\.VI (November J.96l~), 885.
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tD select from among the conflicting interests in society?

And of

what value might such standards be if there are no neutral men,
i.e., individuals sufficiently disengaged from the effects of the
pl.lblic business and thus capable of suspending their self-regarding
impulses as they might act in a disinterested manner?

Implicit, then,

in the problem of order is a problem of power as well.
Power is a process and a relationship.

Por.rer may be relatively

concentrated or diffused; and share of power held by different indivi.duals, strata, classes, ethnic, racial or religious groups, may be
relatively great or small.
ther~fore,

The analysis of power is often concerned,

with the identification of elites and leadership, the dis-

covery of the ways in Hhich po·wer is allocated to different strata, relations among leaders, and bet'I-Teen leaders and

nonlead~rs,

and so forth.

Differences in patterns or structures of power may be attributed primarily s mainly or in part to the r.ray in which "resources," or

11

base values"

are distributed among indi.vid,uals, strata, classes, groups in
different communities, countries, societies, and historical periods.
The plural:i.sts deal v1ith the necessity of mult:!.ple centers of
sovereign power rather than one.

For them, the issue becomes:

the pluralistic model functional or dysfunctional -- when,
why?

hovr

Is
and

The function of pluralism in society has been seen to tame power,

to secure the consent of all or the majority in a democratic society
and to settle conflicts peacefully within the framework of institutions.
Political pluralism can be seen as a systein \'lhich utilizes conflict
rather than suppresses it.

Pluralists feel that by setting one

cEtnter of pmrer against another, po,1"er itself would be tamed,
civilized, controlled and limited to develop human purposes "VJhUc
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coercion would be reduced to a minimum.

The functional core is

solving,mediatirig, conflicts .for politics of factions.

re~

This process

provides an opportunity for minorities to veto solutions they have
strong objection to, but would also prove helpful in estal,Jlishing
channels for

obtaining consent for all to win in the long run.

Because constant negotiations among different centers of p0'1'7er are
necessary in order to make decisions, citizens and leaders would perfect
the process of dealing peacefully with their conflicts, and not merely
to the benefit of one partisan, but to the mutual benefit of all the parties.
The duality of po'1'1er of a pluralistic arrangement, both
social and political, means that 5xidividuals are seldom totally de.,
pendent either upon particular social groups or poHtical officials
for the advancement of interests.

Citizens have options and they

retain choices i.n hO\v best to pursue their desires..

Since multi.ple

affiliations contribute to, as v1ell as reflect, multiple interest,
people seldom put "all theireggs in one basket."

19 Consequently,

there is less tendency to invest any single issue of public policy
with an extreme degree of emotional attachment.

Single-interest

politics, single-issue campaigns, and single-principle parties are rare
in pluralistic communities; rathe1.·, broad polities characteristically
emerge from a process of bargaining and compromising between diverse
interests·..
Politics is dependent on the interplay of the social structures
and the culture in 'vhich it is set.
l~yer

By politics is meant the multi-

complex in which authoritative decisions are made; by culture

18. Dahl, op .. cit., p.

25~

19 .. Nimmo, op. cit., p. 26 ..
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is meant the respository of habitual ways of looking at things and respending to stimuli; and by social structure is meant the patterns of
interaction.

The order that makes society possible is basically a

property of cul,ture, an understanding embodied in established usage.

20

Over and above this basic level of order the ongoing business of politics
proceeds, dealing with conflicts
and the social structure.

and discordances cast up by individuals,

Attempting to handle problems that are new to .

actions which get on the public agendas, the political machanisms become

modes of problem identification.:

In. practice, then, the motivating pm·rer

of polit:i.cs as a form of activity is change in the social structure.
Culture, itself liable to change, provides an ambience for the functioning
institutions of politics and indicates the limits of poli.tical activity.
In trying to understand the context of change and the role of
pluralism Talcott Parsons offered the following points;
1.. Social change ahrays requires enough impetus to
overcome the resistance of vested interest.

2. There are many sources of social change and not merely
one -- offered as "the conception of plurality of the possible
origins of change."
3. Change has a variety of repercussions within the social
system some of which may be contrary to the direction of change.
4 .. Change ·will generally tend to move in the direction that
will increase rather than decre:ase the gratification of members
of the society e
5." Change tendtl in the direction of rationality rather
than the converse. ·

20. David Hinar, Ideas and Politics (Home\·lOod, Illinois:
The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp .. 9·-10. - - - 21. Eugene Jo Heehan, Contemporary P_ol:i.tica~ Tho..':!ZJ:0.:!_~
_2J:it:i.cal_St.u.Ey (Home\1ood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. lL}/+-147.
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The pluralistic system is one form by which the social structure
(:i:,.e., group interests) is organ::i.zed to respond to the above points
concerning change, particularly to assist in providing the methods
(i.e.; compromise, integration) for orderly change.

How did Jackson

and Calhoun differ in their strategic response to the situation of
change as symbolized in the tariff lssue?
Another important lssue in regard to change is the impact
of ideas as variables in explaining political behav1.or, the broad
tendencies of ideas on the institutions of a society, and, on the
regula:r:lzed patterns of behavior that. characterizes a society's
political life.

Hhat consistency existed in the ideas of Calhoun

as they.projected on his political process?

The forces of culture

and social structure merge in the political process of making
authoriative decisions about the conflicts, the problems, the afflict
societyo

Political thought fits into the models on the cultural side;

its birth identifies as well as shapes the culture.

From the political

process emerges policy (laws, administration, rules) which in turn,
feeds back on social structures by changing relationships among its
elements, and/or culture by inducing changes in habitual ways.

The

interact:i.on of the poli.tical process of the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions, the Hartford Convention and the Tariff of Abomination
reverberated off Jefferson's, Jackson's, and Calhoun's political
philosophies, revealing the changes taking place and the consequences
and conflict caused by change.·
Because a pluralistic polity is chara~terized by diversity of
purpose, the meaning of
notions

ot

~

community interest is confounded.

The

public interest, national interest, or common good

symbolize ideals of conunon purpose and striving but are frequently

28

employed to rationalize narrm·mr stands.

Occasionally, a si.ngle

interest may even attempt to elevate its own interest to the level
of the entire community as revealed through the tariff issue.

In

the pluralistic American environment, the legitimacy of the multiple
conflict desires have been generally taken for granted.

Definition

of public interest in this disharmonious collectivity has been contin.
22
gent upon open con fl ~Cto
is factions.

Thus a central problem of a free government

In pluralistic politics the notion of the public

interest serves as a term of interest rationalization and as a goal
binding community members together.

j

consistent social value system.

Diversity of experience precludes
The learning of group loyalties,

the origins and intensity of social conflicts, the relations among
rule'l:'s and ruled, the style of conflict regulations and the perspective
taken on the community will are all affected by' such pluralism.

The

fact of plural purposes also affect the character of comnmn:i.ty :i.deals
and procedures, thus shaping political doctrine and constitut:i.onal
arrangements.
Charles Perro\'7 has identified two related views of pluralism
in the political science tradition which have different impl;ications.

23

One considered the relationship among independent groups and one
emphasized the change in individual attitude.

The f:i.rst he identified

as "veto pluralism" or pressure group plurali.sm..

Here competing

interest groups, homogeneous in themselves, and based on economic
and sectional interests, hold 'countervailing or veto po'imr over one

22. N:i.mrno, op. cit., p. 32.,

23. Charles Perro\·r, "The Soc::i.ological Perspective and POlitical
Pluralism, 11 Social Resea~ch, XXXI (Winter 196ll), 411-422.

·
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another.

Flexibility in a democratic political system is maintained

as long as one interest group does not achieve, in the long run,
complete power over other groups.
place according to this view.

Little "socialization" takes

It reflects a.concern with the exerd.se

of pol-7er and the role of material interest which are merged in
the compromise vie\-7.,

Calhoun, as a pluralist, shall be vie•-1ed

from this perspective; for this was the type of pluralism evident
in the early 1800's.
_There are five points of controversy involved in the compromise
pluralistic format:

1. Are the interest of all significant groups in society
..given representation?
.. 2. Does representation of interest reflect utrue representation"
and not manipulation?

3. Are there multiple group ties and overlapping membership?
4. Do groups accept defeat and compromise on some interests?
5. Does the connn:i.tment to preserve collective effort at
..the expense of full realization of pe2nonal group demands not
erode the pluralistic base of soc~ety? ~
·
-For example, could a settlement of the issue of tariff between
the North and the South be reached?

Calhoun's response was "yes, easily,

but ..... not by the \'leaker party alone • .,·uThe North has only
-to w·ill it to accomplish :i.t -- to do justice by conceding the
South an equal right ..... v;hich ,.,ill restore to the South, in
substance, the power she possessed by protecting herself,
before the equalibrium between t2~ sections was destroyed
.by the action of the government. ·
But what is the basis for Calhoun 1 s repres.entation?
.overlappi.ng membership?

24~

Ibid., pp.

The

Does compromise erode the North's desire to progress?

414-417~

~5. John Anderson, Calhoun:
Basic Documents (State College,
Pennsylvania: ·Bald Eagle P~·ss, 1952);-p:--17.--.-
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In the end Calhoun asked. for the restoration of the political principle
through the generous exercise of power by those who possessed it.
To him true national unity could still be conceived in the terms of
a political theory which recognized the full self-orientation of
individuals and the restricted perspectives of those many social
groups which were so necessary to the very existence of the
dividual.

in~

To Calhoun, true political order depended upon the use

of power by those who control it for the ends of princ:i.ple; and for
its continued existence upon a recognition of the rights of finite
individuals and diverse groups and upon the relation of these two

.

important factorso

26 ,·

Perrow's other type of pluralism was identified as individual
plura-lism which operates on a more latent level.

Individuals in

community neighborhoods, occupational or other established nonpolitical institutions, all differ-:in their overt and latent social
inclinations.

These differenceswill lead to an appreciation of

the viewpoint of others and to a leavening element in the group
which will foster tolerance.

Here individual attitudes are

changed, whereasin compromise pluralism the attitudes of individuals may remain unchanged even though they must ackno,.,ledge the
right of others making opinions in planning action.
Human groups and associations of all sorts ··- from the family
clique, clan and tribe to the largest religious organization and
states

~-

are often in conflict.,

The assumption is not uncommon,

indeed, that "peace within and conflict l'lithout 11 are essential

26. Ibid.,
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characteristics of group life.

Closer examination suggests that

conflicts exist \vithin the various groups themselves -- within
even the most cohensive and durable -- and contribute substantially
.
.
27
to t h e1r perpetuat1on.

Whether inter or intra, hro kinds of ·effects

of conflict may be distinguished.

Conflict may result in the des-

truction or disruption of all or certain of the bonds of unity which
may previously have existed between the disputants..

On the other

hand, conflict may strengthen pre-existing ties or contribute to

conflict over the tariff issue in the early 1800's illuminates the
latter point.

The nationalistic movement was spurred by the threat

of disunion.. . Communication and transportation dre\·i the rest of the
nation together, and as it appeared, as a unified

front against a

minority.,
The concept of conflict involves a policy condition, and
communication, which if directive and if accepted, \'7ill influence
the behavior of the recipent.
or unconscious.

Pvlicy conditions may be conscious

In the latter case, there is no explicit declaration

of policy condition -- though it can be inferred from the behavior
of the organization, e.go, the South inferring from Jackson's earlier
inactivity he would eventually support their stance.
Conflict is for the most part a malleable concept, being
stretched and molded for the purposes at hand..

In its broadest

sense it seems to cover everything from war to choices betvreen ice-

·----------------2 7 .. Le\vis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (London:
Free Press and Glencoe, fcT56)-;-pp. 1.23---;ll~l .. ----------
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c_:r;eam sodas or sundaes.

The distinction between conflict and non-

conflict are fuzzy at best and at worst are not made at all.

There

is also a persistent tendency to regard all conflict as bad, as
susceptible to complete elimination, given "good will," understanding," and as basically different from

11

co-9perationo 11

Levels

of conflict as vTell as intensity must be considered when analyzing
strategic responses to divergent vie'l'rs.

It is important. to note

distinctions between latent and overt conflict,

In latent con-

fllct, no party is attempting -- by any decision or overt act -to achieve its policy cqndition.

By

contrast~

overt conflicts are

those in v7hich one or more parties do att.empt to effect some
change in the situation..

Political pluralism is a process where-

'
by overt conflict can be expressed and hopefully channeled effectively, to prevent destructiveness through unconscious outbursts.
A

major question concerning conflict exists 'vithin the frame-

work of the pluralistic perspective:

How can a society face con-

tinuous conflict among its memb~rs and groups and still maintain
social cohesion and the legitimacy of state autho'rity'/ 8

American

political patterns and the Jacksonian Era offer a laboratory for
exploring this question.

Given Nadison 1 s human condition of

11 con~

flict" and "action" and the situation of the tariff, conflict
exploded with the passage of the Tariff of 1828.

~n1at

happens

to community?
The presence of political cornmunity need not imply any
single interest for all.members other than that of preserving

28. Seymour l•Iartin Lipset, Po!HicaJ..l!an (Garden City:
Doubleday & Company, 1963), p. 2a
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association; the multiplicity-of groups can remain and the plurality
of social demand can continue to be preserved.

Indeed, pluralistic

politics becomes the shaping force of the political community.
basic question is:

mlat is it that makes

a

Another

group of people a-community?

A community comprised of people \·Tho desire to share experience,
will have purposive

activity consummating that desire by settling

disputes being labeled "political community."

Political consensus

is the acceptance or acquie·csence -- '1-lith public officials,
and procedures, democratic values, and policy choices.

r_~u...
l._..e:_-:s._________

Political

con-sensus does not "cause" a particular pattern of political behavior
and may not be consistent with a particular pattern of political
behavior.

It is shaped by social and const5.tutional patterns, as

'1-mll as by a consensus of personal convictions.

It is thus a

working consensus in the sense that it is tentative, f:i.lled with
contingency, and subject to modification.

This w·orking consensus

helps define the issue that must be resolved and the effe'c.t:tve limits
of political conflict at any given time.
-~obert

Dahl hai outlined four pluralistic party strategies

available to a political movement or oppositions groups in the United
States who arrive at the point of little or no representation, .therefore
providing a frame·work for observing Calho:un' s alternatives:
1. A separate political part;'£ be es.tah.U.sh.e.d_..bv______________
create a cohesive force behinq a particular interest.
2. A ne~.,r coalition party be established by combining
w·ith .another group that has sim:i.lar, overlapping, but not
identical objectives.
3. The group can remain neutral betHcen the t\'lO major
parties, act as a pressure group to secure favorable legislation
and the nomination and election of sympathetic candidates.
·
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4. The movement could enter one of the existing parties,
and become an element in a major party coalition; it could
then use its bargaining po~9r to gain influenc~ for the
movement within the party.
The pluralists see political l'elations whether betw·een
or vlithin fundamental parts of the same state, varied; that beyond
a certain point they can not be simplified and generalized; they
depend more upon agreement and good '"ill than authority.
are reached by ·.an interchange of opinions, compromise

Agreements

or differences

degree did Calhoun and Jackson negotiate and upon '"hat level did
the discussions take place?
The pluralist vision as applied to the United States,
and in this research, is meant as a way of looking at things
political vTh:i.ch is congenial to our individualist yet groupstructured, inierest-impregnated and mechanistically asserted
anti-majoritarian mode of political life.
comp~~:omise

The process involves

of interest, pressure groups and sections.

Calhoun's

political rhetoric and practical strategies as revealed primarily
from the circumstances and ramifications surrounding the Tariff
of Abominationt· .the political interchange \'lith Jackson_, and the
deepening economic and social crises for the South, may v1eave
strands of pluralism cons:i.dered basic to ·the tenets of American
political pluralism not previously accredited to him.

~9.

Robert Dahl, op. cit., pp. 429-430.

. CHAPTER III

SITUATION:

THE TARIFF OF ABONINATION

·~·the Tariff of Abominations, a rather strong title
for a quite impracticable piece of legislation, is an almost
perfect mirror in which to observe the transient features
---------~of--.:he Jacksonian revo lunon ..... Not:ning else ••• reflec t~s=-.-.-.--------the pmverful democratic nationalism \vhich opposed itself
to the economic nationalism ••••
George Dangerfield

':a:ro matters -- one an issue and one a condition -- elicited

'rom John

c.

Calhoun the strenuous exertion of systematic thought.

The issue \'las protective tariffs· in t:he period (roughly) of 1828 to
1833 .. ·The condition vms the division of the Union into free states
and slave states, a condition increasingly vexatious from 1835
on.

The two matters are linked; the debete over tariffs turned out

to be a proving ground for many of the conceptions and intellectual
strategies involved in the defense of slavery.
In the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 Calhoun sav7 complete
injustice.

His words against these

meas~res

are terrifying in their

indictment of the protectionists for reckless disregard of the
elementary precepts of political rectitude.
and desolation for the Southern states.

Calhoun predicted ruin

The elimination of pro-

1. George Dangerfield, Jh~enin_g_ of American Nationalisl!l.t,
1815-1828 (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 283.
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tection would relieve the South much more than it would embarrass
the manufacturing states.
In 1828 and 1830, Calhoun's political philosophy (particularly
his concept of community, of the mutual dependence of the political and
soc:f.al order) and practical strategies to maintain the Union, vrhile preserving liberty of "distributing equally the benefits and the burdens
of the Union," became mired in acts of expedience and self-inte:r.est.
Here the

proces~

of Calhoun 1 s political theories j_s thrust before

the American publico
In February 1828, the House Committee on Manufactures brought
before the House of Representatives specific reconrrnondations for a ne>v
tariff schedule.

2

The result was a lopsided, unequal bill, advantageous

to the farmers but wholly inadequate to the manufacturers.

Every

section of the measure showed marks of political preference and favorit ism.

On manufact.ured vrool, in particular, the rates vrere ridiculously

disapporti"onate.

An involved set of schedules were dra\m depending on

price range, not one of which met the basic needs of the manufactures.

3

Henry Clay and the National Republicans suspected the authors
of the tariff desired failure of their o\om bill.

The Jacksonians

were accused of vrriting a bUl to force the New "England Representatives
into joining Southerners on the final vote to kill the unbalanced measure.
The blame .for the defeat would then reside with the friends of

2. The committee membership, as well as both houses of
Congress, .was held by a majority of Jacksonian Democrats.
York:

3 .. John 1?. Burgess, The Niddle P~_<i..,..J:.tD-:_7-1.858 (Ne>v
Charles Scribner's So'i!s, 1897), pp. 160··162 ..
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President John Q. Adams, and the National Republicans.

The historian

Robert Remini has accused the Adams' men (as l'lell.as subsequent interpreters) of lacking appreciation for the more subtle forms of political
manipulation in perceiving the Jacksonian's position and in the
Republican's alternative responses to the schedule presented.

4

The

Republicans just convinced themselves that this "abominable" tariff
had been designed to be defeated and that they were expected to
shoulder the responsibility while the Democrats desired to use the
schedule to secure support of the middle and western states for
Jackson in 1828.
Silas Hright, of Ne>'l York, is said to have divulged the
House Committee's true intention in one of his letters to the NevT
York Regency:
Hhy did vre frame the bill as we did? Because <tTe had put
the duties upon all kinds of woolen cloths as high as our o'~>m
.friends in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Ohio l'lould vote the;:vlhy did v1e put the duties upon Holasses so high? Because
Pennsylvania and our friends vrest of that state required it
to induce them to go for the '\voolens. The Hemp and Flax duty
vTas also inserted for the same reasons, and t~e duty of
Irons and the sine qua non l'lith Pennsylvania.
By logic the bill vras concocted to suit the interest of
"our friends in the Middle Atlantic and Western States" l'lhose
combined electoral vote ''las sufficient to decide the presidential
election in Jackson's favor.

Specifically, it was expected to reverse

the 1824 results in Ohio, Kentucky, and Nissom:i, and to secure the

4. Robert V.. Remini, The Election of Andre\'7 Jackson
(Philadelphia: J. B~ Lippencott Company, f963), pp. 173-·174.
5. Burgess, op. cit., p. 174.
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important- votes in Pennsylvania and New York.
The bill directly penalized the South, those in the cotton
business and those engaged in foreign commerce by increasing the
price of woo.len fabrics, not widening the domestic market for raw
cotton. and increasing the price of Hestern agricultural products
for the Southern consumer.

6

The Northern Jacksonians sa"' the

Southerners regarding Adams as the "acknowledged leader"

of all

manufacturing interests and therefore could not bolt the Democratic
party, \vhile trying to kill the measure since no other choice remained to them.

Clearly, then, the bill seemed an effectively

"strategi-c" response to a political

11

situation."

Two plans arose to kill the measure.

The Southern strategy

was to remain silent during the debate and vote do"m any amendments
that ·would improve the duties on manufactured goodso

In this way some

Southerners felt they could compel the "Eastern" Ne"r England Representatives to join them on the final roll call and kill the entire
tariff.

The

11

Eastern 11 Representatives had a different. plan.

They

agreed, according to Silas Hright, to vote dmm the hemp, flax,
molasses, and iron duties, and then \vatch while the "Jackson tar:i.ff
meh'' from Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky defeated what remained.
The h7o groups opposing the tariff ,.,ere unable to get together on
a single course of action, and this worked to their mutual disadvan:tage ..
The South uent to Jackson's men asking for compromise on
'

the woolen issue in exchange for their support to "sustain" the

6~

Ibid., p. 161.

7~

Remini, op. cito, Ps

175~

7
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bill.

Meanwhile the Eastern Republicans were submitting long lists

of amendments which were voted on April 9 and each defeated in turn;
this action received some immediate arrogant praise by some Southerners
for their effective strategy, much to the dismay of the New Englanders
and vlestern Jacksonians.,

Open praise by the Southerners of their plan

brought George NcDuffie of South Carolina to the point of rage on
·.·

the House floor over the stupid release of the plan which would
alienate the New Englanders and Western friends.

Seven lvestern

delegates began muttering that the action of the Southerners could
provide a risk to the election of Jackson tn their states.

The

tariff was a rock upon which the Democratic coalition might flounder.
On April 22 enough had search their minds to accept the tariff and
by a vote of 105 to 94.

8

Neanwhile Jacksonian supporters unified their efforts
to ensure the election of their leader by arranging a handsome
commission froma satisfied public for the support of special
economic interest.

9

The Senate Committee on Nanufa:cturi.ng. pro-

posed several amendments to increase the duties.

New England

served notice that \.rithout a change in the woolens schedule it
\'Tould reject the tariff on the Hnal vote..

The Southern

strategy again w·as to veto amendments and in case of tie
votes~

rely on Vice President John

the vote in their favor.

c.

Calhoun to dispose of

The Ne,., Englanders and Southerners

8. Burgess, op. cit., p. 162
9.'Glyndon G. VanDeusen, The Jacksonian Era (New· York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 198.

..
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combined strength would probably be sufficient to kill the bill
outright.

10

An amendment to increase the duty on manufactured wool
was passed

2l~-22,

thus accommodating a compromise on the issue

for the Eastern states and insuring passage of the bill.

On May 13,

tl1e final measure was passed by 26-21 vote, the Jacksonian leaders
(Van Buren, Benton, Easton) l'Tere joined by Northeasterners (Hebster,
Silsbee, Knight, Chase, Foote).
Adams on

~fay

The hilt" "ras signed by President·

19, 1828.

Under such circumstances the inevitable questions arose
long before South Carolina was led to nullify the tariff..

What

recourse existed for a section which found itself hopelessly and
apparently permanently outvoted on legislation that it considered
ruinous to its prosperity or self-interest?

It was this question,

as old as the Constitution itself, which eventually led to an
overt attempt to dissolve the Union.,

Towards its solution, Calhoun's

political career was implicitly and explicitly directed..

Southern

opposition would have had to take the form of petitions fo1.· the
tariff repeal, or resistence to.its execution would need
moral support, creation of a party of resistence, or the capture
of some

e~isting

governmental organization by that party or coali-

t.ion.
At the time of the Tariff of 1828, the South had suffered
defeat of its policy by attempting to use its bargaining position
1'lithj_n an existing party and the representative structure.

It also

10. Burgess, op. cit., p. 162.
ll .. Charles M.. Hiltse, J'oh_~S.:__g_~lhr:>~:!l~_!_>1;:lli_!.!.~.J.82~-~~
(Indianapolis: The Dobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 308~309.
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was unable to control the voting in either house of Congress alone.
The leaders were forced to reevaluate the structural as well as
the theoretical positions taken in 1828 for political changes
involving:

the operating structure of government, the values

and policies adopted and enforced, the relative influence of
different strata and groups in the polides and decisions of
government, ancl. the social, ethnic, religious, psychological and
other significant characteristics of political leaders.

A variety

------------.o£-a-te-ernat:tves l'Tere used-Before a viaole arrangment was reached
to end or dissipate the_conflict.
The structure of government provided three branches through
which the groups could try to maneuver their"policy nationally.

Also

with the federal construction, success \'lith some issues might be
achieved in the states which could not be achieved on the national
level..

Calhoun, as one of the major leaders from the South, attempted

to use a variety of structural alternatives available to achieve
success for the policy he supported (involving the conflict of
sectional i.nterest and the general community).

The logical conclusion

being if all avenues on the national level were denied to Calhoun
concerning the passage or compromise on the policyt there was still
the alternative of withdrawing from the general community and carrying on the policy at the state level..

Calhoun felt there was

much precedent for the conflict and compromise of sectional interests and the general community interest, of political order and
political liberty.

Calhoun turned to the practical acts of counter-

vailing forces in a nation undergoing a surge of strong nat.iona.lismu

He also turned to the philosophical basis provided by

Jefferson, Madisont Adams, and

~he f~~era_!._~st Paper~.

Calhoun
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was an a·stute student of the nation 1 s historical developments.
In the tw·o decades after 1815, the various sections were by
no means unanimous or even consistent in their stand on all the
economic legislation introduced in Congress.

For example, New

England representatives voted 17 to 10 in favor of the Tariff of

1816 but 23 to 16 against the Bill of 1828..

Southern votes against

the measure increased from 35 in 1816 to 47 in 1828, while the
Middle States supported both, 42 to 5 and 56 to 6.

The Middle

but a majority from New· Engalnd, the Southeast and the Southwest
were i n opposL't'1on. 12

South Carolina voted for the Tariff of

1816 and Calhoun in 1820 did not regard the effort to restrict
slavery to be a danger to the South .. · Also, t\i'o new elements had
been added to the mechanism of obtaining a congressional majority
for legislation:

the voting power of the class-conscious

commonman who, "1ith the general adoption of "1hite manhood suffrage,
for the first time began to exercise the franchise; and the grm·ring
poli.tical strength of a consciously powerful West.

Also, the

party structure had become significant i.n the execution of the
political process.

13

The United States l'las in a period of transition, five disti.nct
·sections (Northeast, the Middle States, the Southeast- old South,
the Northwest, and the Southwest) iri the nation revealed a rapid
growth in population, the loss being New England with only

12 .. Gerald H~ Capers, John c. CalhoEE_:~l~_!.~mi.st
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p6 94o
13. Remini, op. cit., p. 23.
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an

eighteen per cent increase over the ten year span of 1820-1830

and the Southeast with only nineteen per cent.
gro~~ing

rapidly.

14

The West was

Eleven states had been admitted to the Union

betw·een 1789 and 1821 with twenty-two Senators; the original
thirteen states had t;.Tenty-six Senators.

Since none of the five

sections "t-Tas static, but in transition, the future was politically
unpredictable.
I't was obvious that no section acting alone in Congress

possessed sufficient strength during the period to enact or block
specific measures.

To ac.complish its purpose it was nec·e·ssary

for a section to form temporary alliances, no>-T

'~ith

one section or

interest, now with another, to pass or defeat a particular bill.
There was some tendency for these alliances to become permanent;
each section or interest, in order to attain success on those
measures it regarded as most vital to its interest, "VTOuld yield
on .less vi.tal measures to insure the necessary support.

It was

a matter of effecting and preserving a congressional majority for
or against particular legislation on l·rhich there vras acute dis;,.
agreement throughout the nation.
Precedent and the Constitution

'~ere

much involved.

Nore

significant than the question of >-Thether the tariff lvas or was not
protectlve was the commentary it offered on the nature of representative government
or pluralism.

and the role and effectiveness of factions

The members of Congress who passed judgment on

the bill did so in terms of the effect they believed it ,.;ould have

------------------14. Capers,

op.

~it.,

pp. 91-92.
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upon the fortunes of those whose voice of consent placed them in
office (Transportation and communications of the time encouraged
close alignment of special interests -- agriculture, commerce,
navigation and manufacturing - .. with sectional interests.).

It

w·as localism, not nationalism, that sv1ayed the voting on both
sides, in all but a handful of cases.
played a less significant part.
its favor to 23 opposed.

State and party divisions

The Republicans case

35 votes in

15

The protection of this pluralistic process vTith three
checks and a variety of channels accessible to· the citizens
gave dissent factions alternate routes to accomplish political
ends.

Madison dealt extensively ,.lith this issue in The Federalist

Papers, Number Ten and Number Fifty-One.
Since two senators were to be chosen by each state regardless
of population, the Senate would be minority's first line of defense.
Th~

upper house could reject a measure passed by the lower house,

in which representation '·ms based directly on population.

Thus the

Baldwin Tariff of 1820, after passing the House, was defeated by
one vote in

th~

Senate;

the Tallmadge Amendment of 1830 restricting

slavery in Missouri, successful in the House, ,.,as also rejected
by the Senate.

16

A second check ,.,as the President, v1ho might veto a bill as

15. Ibid.

16. Capers, op. cit., p. 94.
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Madison,

Monroe, and Jackson did those on internal improvements

with the result that a two-thirds majority of each house would be
required to override the veto.
this check

l'Tas

By the 1820's the effectiveness of

severely lim1.ted due to the faHure of the original

plan in 1789, as conceived by some, for the election of the executive
to work as a minority check. . The same political majority >'lhich
controlled the House could elect the President, and unpopular vetoes
might defeat him and his party in the next election.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---4._

o_tentJally_far_mor-f.Lpow:erful-as-a-checlc-On-the-ma~ol._it-y.__~-----~-

was the Supreme Court, free from any necessity of re-election and
changeable only by impeachment, death or rettrement, or congressional
increase of its membership.

Acting on its power as the final judge

of the constitutionality of federal actions, the Supreme Court
could simply declare that the power upon which a particular bill
in qt:estion rested had.not been delegated to the federal government
by the Constitutione
num~rous

Under the broad construction of John Marshall's

decisions, hO'!rlever, in case after case the Court had in-

creased the po\\rer of the federal government, notably in the McCulloch

ys Maryland decision of.1819$

By increasing the power delegated to

the federal government in most instances prior to the Jacksonian
Era, the Court actually insured the supremacy of the political
majority in Congress over the minority ..
It was natural, therefore, that in the ear.J.y years of the
new nation minorities should attack both the assumption of pm·1er
by the Supreme Court as the ultimate judge of constitutionality,
and the validity of specific decisions handed dotm by the Court
sanctioning the right of Congress to legislate on such matters as

46
~he

Bank;

Despite all that was said and written about the rights

of states, however, with the exception of the action of the New
England states during the critical war years (1812-1815) minorities
had gained relief from measures considered obnoxious only by
inducing a majority in Congress to favor repeal.

But Calhoun would

appeal to the Courts (as one path available in a pluralistic approach)
to settle outstanding differences between the sections concerning
the tariff issues; he vmuld also appeal to Const:i.tutional interpretations in developing his philosophical argument starting in 1816
through the crisis of the Tariff of

Abomination~

The first formal instance of state action came >vhen the
legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia declared the Sedition Act
of 1798 null and void because it violated the First Amendment of
the Constitution.

The famous Resolutions written by Jefferson and

Madison argued that the Constitution was a compact among f::he states,
each retaining "an equal right to judge for itself, as well as
infractions as of the mode and measure of redress."

17

No other

state supported these two, hov;ever, and no act of state interposition '\'Jas attempted.

But in the process of differentiating the

spectrum of Jefferson's ideas, it was this

11

band of color, 11 to v1hich

Calhoun turned as a basis for the South Carolina

E~pos.~tion

and Protest.

The Resolutions may have been designed by their authors primarily
as a political maneuvero
tvTO

The Sedition Act •·ms in force for only

years; >vhen the Republicans defeated the Federalists in 1800

Comm~mger (ed), Documents of American History
Heredith Publishing Company, 1963), {):-i1fz.

17. Henry Steele
(New York:
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they simply let t"he measure expire..

It was not state action but

rather the Republica1_1 1 s acquisition of control

th~

the federal govern-

ment which brought relief.
In order to prevent war with England, Jefferspn pushed through
the Republican Congress at the end of 1807 an Embargo Act >'lhich
immediately ruined most of the New England shipping profits and
shortly

involved the entire nation in a serious depression.,· In

almost identical words, the Massachusetts legislature revived the
arguments of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions; but again it
was not state action but federal pov1er which brought relief.

So

acute v1as the depression that Net-7 York bolted the Republican
Party, and representatives from that state joined the Federalists
in voting to repeal the measure fifteen months after its passage.

18

In.. the darkest days of the liar of 1812, the Ne>'l England
states met in a convention at Hartford to organize for joint action,
both against the federal government 'i7hich was threatening to draft
their citizens and against the British enemy which at last \'las
invading

them~

Taking advantage of the crisis in Nhich the nation

found itself and using secession as a tacit threat, delegates from
the convention >·;ere instructed to proceed to l.Jashington and demand
certain amendments to the Constitution which would check the power
of the Republican

majority~

The news of.the Peace of Ghent pre-

vented the New England representatives from submitting their
ultimatum; the end of the war removed the ·immediate cause of

18. Capers,· op. cit.; p. 97.
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·.New England's discontent. 19
As a member of Congress and a former resident of Nel., England,
Calhoun was aware of the full bitterness of Nev1 England 1 s revolt
against Southern domination.

He understood v1hat lay behind the

revolt and had sought to remove some causes of resentment through
moderate legislation to ease Nev1 England's financial bind.

Also

at this crucial time Calhoun hastily declined the empty chair of
Speaker of the House of Representatives when it ~1as offe.red to him·.
Thougnhe commanded----r:he necessary votes for approval, national
unity was imperative and he was well aware of the bitterness and

.

resentment in New England at the time.

20

undaunted by the activities at Hartford.

Bascially Calhoun was
Of New England's right

to secede he had no doubts, but he \'las equally sure of their
basic loyalty.

Yet he \'larned his fello-vl legislators of :the

dangers inherent in a "false mode of thinking."
A ·minority lacked the right to involve the country
ruin •••• Ho>'l far the minority in a state of war, may
justly oppose the measures of Government, is a question,
of delicacy •••• Anupright citizen will do no act, whatever his opinion of the war, to put' his country in the
pm.;er of the enemy ..... Like the system of our State and
General government -- w·ithin they are many -- to the
world but one., .... This sympathy of the T..,h2fe with ....
every part ••• constitutes our real Union ..

in

Prior to 1832, therefore, minorities accomplished some
success i'lithout any basic .changes in the Constitution and with a
minimum of state action.

In eacll instance time worked to their

19. Ibid.
·(Boston:

20. Margaret L. Coit,.John C., Calhoun: American Portrait
Houghton Hifflin Company, 1950), p .. 95 ..
21. Ibid., pp. 96-98.
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advantage.

The party in power might eventually be defeated or at

least split on crucial measures; by combining threats l'tith bargains,
a determined minority might gain its point or a tolerable compromise.
In essence and in outcome the nullification crisis of the early thirties
was not >·tithout precedent.

But Calhoun \'tas quite aware of the potential·

for sectional and minority economic interests during this period of
transition.

A Southern minority objected str-=nously to the high

tariffs of 1828 and 1832, \'lhich the legislature. of South Carolina

took drastic action by confronting the nation with the threat of
civil \<Tar, a majority yielded on the issue, an act of compromising.
A threat to fordbly defy a federal act and possibly to secede

from the Union induced a congressional majority to accede to some
of the demands of an aroused

minority~

But the threat must be

considered in light of the variety of avenues pursued by Calhoun,
and the processes provided in the constitutional structure.
In her major objective of obta:i.ning recognition of the right
of nullification, which \'Tould have afforded the minority a more
extensive check upon federal legislation then the Hartford proposals, South Carolina, like Kentucky and Virginta, did not receive the support of a single state.

Had her contentions been

accepted as a valid interpretation of the Constitution, a minority
of just over one-fourth of the states (and possibly an even smaller
numerical minority of the total population) could have set aside a
disputed federal act by the simple device of rejecting an amendment
delegating
.to the. federal. gov~rrunent power to legislate on the
.
matter in question.

Calhoun cleverly selected >-rhat some considered

50

an innocuous premise '\'lhich he could logically develop to the desired
conclusion.

Both New England and South Carolina met total defeat

in their efforts to establish a formal procedure for the greater
protection of the minority interests.

The Senate, the President,

and the Supreme Court remained the only accepted institutional
checks upon the action of the absolute . numerical majority in the
House~

But several informal checks existed, and were expanded,

e.g., lobbying by interest groups.

of a state at nullification.

The various tariff bills of this era

were far more the work of politicians than of manufacturers; the
facile conclusion of the 1840's that the early tariffs were a
tribute forced on the agrarian South by an industrial New England

.

was an anac h ron~sm.

22

The young nationalists in the postwar Congress,

Calhoun no less than Clay, had staunchly favored the tariff in
order to protect the nation's infant industries as well as to
provide revenue for the payment of the war debt and .for the construction of essential internal improvements.

The divergent

economic development of his mm section forced Calhoun later to
alter slightly his view on this program as well as the excess
of revenue accumulating in the Treasury.

Henry Clay, on the

contrary, continued enthusiastically to advocate.the "American
System" and expected its popularity to elevate him to the Presidency.

22. Danie.l Raymond, "Protective Duties," The Great Tariff
DebaJ:Ej!,1 _ 1~_20-1830, ed. George Rogers Taylor (Bosto';;": D.. C. He~th
and Company, 1953), pp. 66-67; also see D. A. Harriman, American
Tariffs from Plymontl:_ Rock to' NcK:i.nley. 2 ~<?.!!t.E..~.et~_and Important
!Iisto:r::L (New York: The American Protective TarHf League, 1892),
pp. 23··2 7 ~
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From 1816 to 1832 tariff bills were passed every four years
by Congress, with the single exception of the year 1820 "VThen the
measure was defeated by a one-vote margin in the Senage.

The

average rate of protection raised in 1824 to ·thirty-seven per cent,
almost twice that of the original bill of 1816.

As each sucessive

tariff bill in the twenties won majorities in the House, it seemecl
impossible to defeat any general tariff measure (A bill to extend
specific protection to a specific item, the Woolen Bill of 1827,
failed in the Senate when Vice President Calhoun cast his vote
. h t h e oppos1t1on
. .
. wh.1ch ex1ste
.
d • ) • 23
w1t
to b rea k t h e t1e

It had

become so obvious that an increasing majority of Americans were
strongly in favor of the tariff that no prospective candidate
for the presidency -- not even Jackson himself -- dared be suspect
in pro-tariff areas of opposition to the ..seneral ,Erinciple of

.

protectJ.on.

24

The strongest sentiment for the tariff came from the
·North"VTest and the Hiddle States, Pennsylvania in particular; the
fact that the rate of population increased in these states was the
greatest in the nation made the prospects of defeating it slim.,
Practically every local interest in the nation, except planters and
shipmmers,

v1ere convinced that they profited from the tariff.

As a matter of fact the cotton-goods manufacturers were probably
the only group ·who derived any definite financial benefit, but
both the politicians and the people in general ·were won over to

23 .. Burgess, opo cit.; p. 162.
24. Remini, op. cit., p. 74.
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with ideas.

25

Whatever profit vroolen-goods manufacturers derived

from the increased price of their finished product was offset by
a proportionate increase in the COSt of raw domestic \'TOol, vThich
resulted from the same tariff bills.
there was no

26

In the writing of the bills

objective attempt to determine the ultimate effect of

the numerous schedules upon the·whole economy of any section, state
.
or maJor

.

econom~c

.

.

~nterest.

27

The depression of 1819 severely hurt the Southeastern economy.
The simple cause of all the resulting ills were seen embodied in
the tariff -- a diabolical plot on the part of the North to cheat
.

.

.

.. ·; ~ . ::· .·

proud and superior Carolinians of their vrell-deserved prosperity. •·
Also certain South Carolinian leaders savr in the tariff the prelude
to an attack upon slavery, the central institution of their society
no less than of their economy.

The Tallmadge Amendment of 1820 had

convinced some of a deep-seated design in the North eventually to
abolish slavery throughout the entire Union (Calhoun was not one.).
The Nat Turner slave-insurrection in 1830 heightened those fears,
thus intensigying feelings tm·rard the tariff issue.

The interlocking

nature of the t\'m issues decreased the areas of effective interaction
bet,•reen the North and South and limited the issues of compromisee
As stated earlier, the South had not \'li shed to endanger
Jackson's election, for i t looked to him as the future President

25. Capers, op. cit., p. 100.
26. Joseph Dorfman, The Economic 1-!ind in Ameri.can Civilization,
1806-1865 (Ne\'T York: Charle.s Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 212.
27. Ibid.,

P~
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to redress the 'I'Trong inflicted against its section. - Jackson 1 s

=

vague tariff stand prior to 1828 is best revea"led in the 1824 campaign:
So far as the Tariff before us eniliraces the design of
fostering, protecting, .and preserving within ourselves the
means of national defiehse.e •• I support it •••• Providence has
filled our mountains and our plains >·Tith ••• grand materials for
our national defense, they ought to have extended to tl)em •••
protection, that our manufacturers and laborers may •••
produce within our mvn borders, a supply ••• essential to
28
war •••• This .... judicious ••• Tariff ••• possesses ••• the remedy.
Many Southerners 'vere also banking on Calhoun being Jackson's
successor.

In 1824 Calhoun supported a free trade policy but

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--z9·~-----

favored tariff if nec'essary to insure certain industrial productions.
Fev1 Southern representatives had intentions of antagonizing

\-lesterners, whose political support \•Tas essential against the
grovling power of an industrial North.

Western increase in re-

presentation was important in the sway of balance for Congressional decisions.

And since the essence of any political tariff

involves the whetting of appetites, so :.the Tariff of 1828 was designed
for. special advantages, to specific interests, for directed purposes, particularly those of the West.
The campaign of 1828 was not fought upon the issues of
any

\•Tell~established

difference tn political a-nd economic politics

for the specific tariff issue crossed part lines and Jackson ran
more on personality than concrete political facts.

He appealed

to the masses on his image of having been cheated out of his right
in 1824, and the VTho1e past of official secrecy under the present

28. Marquis James, Andrmv Jackson: Portrait of a President
(New York: (;rossett & Dunlap, 1937), PPo 78·· 79.29~

Wiltse, op. cit., pp. 285-286.

st~

administration~·

"'l'he . J.?~,ople" must take hold of government. Party

divisions in 1828 were still largely.dominated by consideration
of personal partisanship, and the organization of the

.bro

parties,

which had emerged from the all-encompassing Republican party, still
lacked strong competition.
'tying bett-reen the simple extremes of unprinciples politics
and rigid morality, union and disunion, order and chaos, is a
domain of action called the "ethics of responsibility."

Strategies

~~~~~~-engaged-by-the-po-1-iticans-:!:n-resporrse-to-the-tar:tff-si:tuati:orrhad:~------~·

in some manner to \'l'eigh the consequences of various alternatives.
The American tradition at that point reJected fanaticism and
rigidity as too simple for the complex process of achieving political order and liberty.

Conflict resulted.

What processes,

strategies, were used in response by Jackson and Calhoun?

CHAPTER IV

STRATEGIES:

AMENABILITY/PRUDENCE/FORCE

T~eir object is disunion •••• The laws of the United
States must be executed. I have no discretionary power
on the subject; mr duty is emphatically pronounced in

--------~the-Constitut-ion~,------------c-----------------------

Andrevl Jackson

.Let it never be forgotten that power.can only
be opposed by power, organization by organization;
and on this theory st2nds our beautiful federal
system of government.
John C. Calhoun

The Tariff of Abomination \vas passed just prior to the
elecUon of 1828 and dominated the political interaction of
AndrevT

~lackson

and John

c.

Calhoun.

tariff confrontation between the

t\-m

The ambience for the
men vms:

The Bank Issue,

the Peggy Eaton Affair, power of the Supreme Court, extended
suffrage, party alterations.
Jackson'~

Three high points mark their exchanges:

First Address to Congress

Calhoun's South Carolina

1. Andrew Jackson, "Proclamation on Nullification,"
Compilation_ of t~.e .Messages and Papers of the Pr~er_:t~,
1789-1897, ed. James D. Richardson, 1. (Hashington, D. c.:
Bureau of National Liberation and Art, 1909), 655.

J::.

2. John C., Calhoun, "Force Bill on the Collection Bill,"
John Anderson, Calhoun: Basic Documents (State College, Pennsylvania:
~ald Eagle Press, 195.2), p. 183 ..
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Exposition and Protest; the Jefferson Memorial Dinner, and its
ramificat-ions; and the Tariff of 1832 .__ The South Carolina Nullification -- Jackson's Force Bill.
The exact details of Jackson's and Calhoun's conduct during
the critical years from 1828 to 183l.cannot be established.

For

example, \vhile Calhoun secretly wrote the South Carolina Exposition
and Protest in the early fall of 1828, he never avo•tTed his authorship nor officially committed himself to nullification unt_c_:::_ic:cl_h____:_c:i.--'-s_________
public letter of July 4, 1831.

But the interaction of what Jackson

and Calhoun officially said and officially did provides a basis for
analysis of political styles.
The Jacksonian Era w·as dominated ideologically by the
revolution and reinforcement of certain basic American political
commitments (e.g., Constitution, Bill of Rights) and democratic
poli.tical procedures -- fixed spheres of political authority.
11

The

Sp.irit of the Age" reflected rising nationalism, a "national identity,"

where more attention was given to the role of the federal government
and the people as one unit.

Political democracy revolved around the

medium, arid process more than the

achievem~nts of Jackson's party. 3

The tariff issues engaged all comers, particularly the
forces of nationalism, sectionalism, and economic interests.

The shifts

in the economy and in population plus the increase in franchisement
heightened the tension for the nation's political figures --removable

3. Harvin Neyers, The
Vintage, 1960), p. 7.

Jacksonia~suasion

(New York:
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spheres of political·authority.

4

As numerous historians have

explored, many themes ·ran through the Jacksonian Era:

equality,

privilege; liberty, domination; honest \'Tork, idol exploit; natural
dignity, factitious superiority; patriotic conservatism, alien
innovation; progress, dead precedent.

5

These interactions involved

factions and conflict, compromise and consensus, for the American
political system.

Jackson's and Calhounis method pf persuasion, of

response to' this period of transition, differed although they grew

Both men were national figures prior to the election of 1828.
Jackson, with his frontier education and keep attachment to that section
of the nation, was thrusted into the national lime light with the
Battle of Ne'·' Orleans and remained there with his activities in Florida,
his one session in Congress and his b:i.d for the Presidency in 1824.
Calhoun 1 s constitutency was also basically national. New· England
educated, he returned to the South only to be elected to Congress
in 1811, served as Secretary of War under Monroe, and elected Vice
President in 1824..

His New England education and residency had deeply

embedded in him the commitment of the North to the Union, while
enriching his mm national conunitment ..

4. A counter thesis is Richard HcCormick's analysis of
voting turnout patterns \·lhich shm.; none of Jackson's elections
involved a 11 mighty democratic uprising," in the sense that voters
w·ere dra\'m to the polls in unprecedented proportions. When compared with the peak participation records for each state before 1824,
or with contemporaneous gubernatoral electionst or most particuarly
with the vast outpouring of the electorate in 18lJ.O, voter participation in the Jackson elections was unimpressive.. Richard
McCormick, 11 New Perspectives Qn Jacksonian Politics," American
Historical ReyJ.e"~' LVI (Narch, 1960), 288-301.,
5. Meyers, op. cit., p. 10.

58

=
The uplands of South Carolina spmmed both men.

6

They

were descendents of the same stubborn Scotch Irish stock; and
neither was likely to yield a conviction.
that

11

Life is a struggle against eviL. 11

7

his presidency as a moral crusade against

Calhoun once declared
So too did Jackson see
evil~

8

t~ereas

Jackson

turned to the frontier experiences for political and moral guidance,
the political activities in South Carolina helped to mold Calhoun's
pol:i.tical .thought and behavior, e.g., repr~~!l!at~.on and source of power ..
The lm<Tcountry of South Carolina had sought to maintain a
cent·ury ol~ vested economic interest against the sheer weight of
numbers.

The upcountry demanded political equality which would

carry vTith it the pmv-er to rectify the economic inequality between
the sections..

It was to this sectional struggle that Calhoun referred

forty years latter when the prosperity of the entire South was challenged by a

numerically s'tronger interest.

It vms an important

influence in determining his future career and in molding his
political creed.

calhoun's father, a·major leader of the compromise,

had been on the side o£ the

numerical majority in 1790.

·Health,

aristocrariy, cultural and political control were the characteristics
!

6. Location of Jackson's birth was in disputed territory
beti'leen North and South Care J.:i.na; at the time of Jackson 1 s, birth
it vms held by South Cai·olina, though later granted to North
Carolina.. Charles N. Hiltse, John Cc Calhoun: Nul)_ifier, 18291..839 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Nerrill Company, Inc .. , 1949), pp. 19-21.
7. J. Franklin Jameson, ed., Corre2.12ondence of 2ohn C.
Calhoun, II (Annual Report of the American Histod.cal Association for
18-99
q.[f!{ ... q.45.

-r:-

8 .. This is a basic thesis of Hartin Neyers, op. cit., pp .. 3-10.

I
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of the lm-1 country.

For

t"Vlo

generations the lm'lcountry had feared the

potential dominance of the uplands \'lhile the latter resented with ·
In 1790 a compromise

grouping bitterness itsen£orced subjugation.
was reached.

Representation of the· upcountry increased substantially

in both houses of the state legislature.

New

el~ctoral

districts

determined vrith equal regard to population and taxation, so that.
money and political power would not necessarily be synonymous... The
arrangement still left the low coast in control of the Senate and
the hills · increased control in the House.
a numerical
but two

gr~at

majority,

A concurrent rather than

not of one portion of its people over another

interests, had been given protection against each other

and this very action was responsible for mutual attachment.

9

This

was seen as a device for securing justice for all minority (major)
ec.onomic groups "''Tithin the

population~

Further elaboration \·las to

be Calhoun's great contribution.
The cariacture

11

Man of Iron" has been used descriptively

for both Jackson and Calhoun.

The "Han of (Nalliable) Iron" was

used by John Hilliam Hard to illuminate the image of Jackson:
Through his career, Jackson vras lauded as a man of iron;
his iron v1ill \•ras central to innumerable descriptions of his
character •••• The several actions in Jackson's life ••• shou the
irresistable strength vrhich heaven has granted to an honest
purpose. They shm-1 the homage which men pay to an iron ·wi 11,
based upon the consciousness of right· intention .... fBot) a man
of will which might prove to be unbridled egotism.

(Boston:

9. Margaret L. Coit, J'ohn c. Calhoun: Arneri.can Portrait
Houghton Hifflin Co~1pany, 1950), pp~ 45-50.

10. John William 't-lard, An4_rew Jackson :: SJ11!bol For An _A_ge
Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 157, 185, 202.

(New York:
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Calhoun has been cast in a slightly different image of
cast iron.

iron~

Harriet Nartineau after a tour in the South reflected on

the harsh conditions as '\'Tell as the major national figure '"ho seemed
to embody the character she wanted to portray.

Calhoun was a "cast

iron man who looks as if he had never been born, and could never be
extinguished.o"

11

Calhoun '\'Tas a gentleman possessing the social graces and charm
of the Southern plantation class but his portraits show him, and

----~----------------~

as many of his contemporaries saw· him, a

dispassionate, a direct,

and a lonely man whose mind follmmd a logical path unobstructed by
emotion.

Clay caricaturized him as:

• • • ta 11, careworm, With fun·ovTed brow, haggard and
intensely gazing, looking as if he were dissecting the
last abstraction which sprun from metaphysician's brain,
and muttering to himself, ~n half-uttered tones, 1 This
1
is indeed a real crisise 1
Robert B. Rhett of South Carolina said, 11He understood principles ....
.
.
.
13
but he did not understand how best to control and use ••• man."
The paths of these two "Hen of Iron 11 crossed early in their
careers; in 1818 Jackson toasted Calhoun as
noblest work of God."

11

an honest man, 11

11

the

In 1825 Jackson '·rrote "Calhoun was the only

friend I had in the Cabinet;" though in 1830 he referred to Calhoun

11. Harriet Martineau, Retrospect of Hestern Travel (London:
Saunders and Otley, 1838), pp. 147-148.
12. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition
(New York: Vintage, 1948), p. 74 ..
13. Ibid., p. 77.
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as "an ambitious demagogue t·lho >"TOuld sacrifice friends and country
. ,,ll~
an d move . h eaven an d· ear th. to gra ti. f y h.~s own amb.1 t.
·1ons,

The

early amiability between the tvTO diminished to the point that
sulphurous clouds of personal abuse at times all but obscured

. ·"

the maJor issues before the country.

JACKSON'S FIRST ADDRESS TO CONGRESS CALHOUN'S SOUTH CAROLINA EXPOSITION AND PROTEST

--------

.

In 1828, with an electoral vote of 178 and 171 respectively,' - - - - - Andre,., Jackson and John
. . 15

o ff 1ce.

c.

Calhoun were overwhelmingly voted into

Innnediately the signs of the fundamental maxims of

Jeffersonian philosophy v1ere joined, then were
another.

pitte~;~

ngainst one

As Jackson •rrote his first address to Congl·ess, Calhoun

listened to the responses of the nation to the Soutl:!__farolina

Jackson's primary victory and, :i.n

fact~

it advocated the election

of General Jackson as a Southern meansfor reducing the tariff.

-

The Exposition advocated a supposedly consU.tutional method

-.

by which South Carolina could disobey a tariff passed by Congress
and still remain in the Union.

Numerically the South had lost in

Congress, a Congress declared by Calhoun in 1812 as the bulhmrk of

.

democracy..

16

The South had lost~ and, it was uiw.ble to form a

coalition or negotiate a compromise.

Other avenues \vou1d have to

14. Gerald N.. Capers~ .::!ol~~~pagl0u.~_'::'-..21P.ortunist
(Gainesville: University of Florida Pr6ss, 1~60), p. 127.
15. Robert v. Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson
(Philadelphia: J., B" Lippencott.Co~;i;y ,-19{3) ;-p-~··-·13-7·:--·16 .. Charles H. Hiltsc, _Iohn C~ C<~}::?._~n.!..__Nu]j.if_ie..E.J..__!829.:.~2.
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs~:·Ivlerr:i.ll Company, Inc .. , 191,9), p$ lt99 ..

\
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be pursued, i.e., the election of Jackson which Calhoun not only

=

foresaw as a method reducing the tariff but also cementing a
South- Hest coalit'ion.

17

The Exposition consisted of three major points.

The first

was a realistic survey of the economic effects of the tariff, stating
the numerous reasons 'I'Thy it was unconstitutional, and unjust.

A major

point emphasized was that the South was responsible for two-thirds of
the nation's exports, but was politically no more than one-third of
the nation therefore the tariff

~vas

a clear case of" opp_r_e__9_s_LQn_hy_th"'e~-----

. . .
18
maJOn.ty.
The second point

~-ms

a detailed description of the allegedly

constitutional method by ·which South Carolina could reject the tariff,
and yet remain in the Union without fear of coercion from the federal
government.

Here Clahoun drew upon,·an assortment of weapons from the

armories of John Taylor of Carolina, Robert Turnbull, Judge Spencer
Roane and the Virginia and Kentuck:t: ;Resolutions..

There was, he said,.

in effect, no division of sovereignty between states and the

g~neral

government.

Government

Government was one thing, sovereignty another.

was strictly limited, sovereignty resided in all its amplitude in the
people of the several states.

Thus the Constitution itself vms merely

a compact between sovereign states.

19

The third point. asserted that the. state vrould
though i t

"~<laS

!

de~ay

nullification,

clearly her constitutional right, in the hope that the

17. John Anderson, Calhoun: Basic Documents (State College,
Pennsylvania: Bald Eagle Press, 1952); p. 19.
. .
18. George Dangerfield, The Awakening of American Nationpl_i,smz
1815-1828 (Ne,.; York: Harper and Rmv, 1965), p. 28!+.
19. Anderson, op. cit .. , p. 9.

I
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majority w·ould come to its senses and grant her relief.

The basis for

this hope was the anticipated election of General Jackson 'vho would
restore "the pure principles of our government."

20

Should Jackson

fail, South Carolina \vould proceed with "her sacred duty to interpose; -- a duty to herself -- to the Union -- to the present, and to
future generations -- and to the cause of liberty over the \V'Orld. 11
Calhoun's motives in writlng the

_!~position

21

and in his subse-

quent conduct were by no means self-evident, and they are still
--------sub~-ec-t-s-G-f-mu-G-h-d-i-s-pu-t-e-.~P-reba-b-1-y-t-hc--s-imp-1-e-s-t-e*p-1-a-n-a-t-i-on-i-s-t-h-a-t~---~-

of the leading scholar on the question, Frederic Bancroft, who regards the whole business as merely another instance of Calhoun's
jockeying for the presidency..

The Vice President "believed that he

could slip on Jefferson's clothes of 1798 and, sooner or later, walk
into the White House. 1122

But there is some evidence to support the

contrary position that Calhoun was sincerely concerned for the welfare
of the South and the preservation of the Union, and was 'villing to suborcinate his personal ambitions.

The tariff appeared to be a tremendous

burden, if not ruinous, to the South; anticipating the frontal attack
upon slavery by extremists soon to come, he vras also attempting to
eatablish nullification as a defense in advance of that attack.

If the

preservation of the Union lvas his major concern, he \vas indirectly striving to avoid a situation where a disaffected minority might in desperation
take action vThich would lead to dissolution or. to civil w·ar.

.

20. Ibid., p. 40.
21. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
22. Jameson, op. cit., p. 810.

This he
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would do by simply giving the minority sufficient power to protect
itself against the tyranny of the majority.
It is plausible that to Calhoun's mind these three objectives,
his political ambitions, the welfare of the South, and the preservation
of the Union, merged.

In a letter "Yrritten in September, 1830, a year

before Calhoun >vas compelled publicly to announce his support of
nullification, to Virgil Maxcy of Maryland, He commented ·on his
political future:
I must merge my interest in the higher sense of du~yo ••
in future advancement ••• how·ever st2~ng may be my ambition,
my sense of duty is till stronger.
·
Calhoun vmnt on to sa.y that he realized many of his northern
friends expected him to check the nullification movemento

But only

Jackson, in his opinion, could do so, by lowering the tariff and
granting the Nullifiers what they were threatening to accompHsh.by
independent state action.

Calhoun said compromise and concessions

come from strength which >vas held by sections other than the South.
If, I really believed, that aivil discord, revolution or
disunion >·Tould follm-1 from the measure cqntemplated, I >-rould
not hesitate, devoted to our system of government, as I am,
to thro\v myself in the current with a view to arrest i·t at any
hazard, but believing that the State, while she is struggling
to preserve her reserved power, is acting with devoted loyalty
to the Union, no early considerat:i.on would induce me to do an
act, or utte:rLa sentiment, which >muld cast an imputation on
.
L ~
h er motl.ves.
Finally Calhoun stated that the tariff was merely the occasion
of the controversy, but that the "peculiar domestic institution o£ the
Southern States"· vtas the basic cause.

Slavery as v1ell as the soil and

23., Frederic Bancroft, Calhoun and the South'Carolina Nullification
Hovement (Ne~v York: Longmans, Green-, 1928), p. 122.

24. Jameson, op. c:i.t., p. 81.1.
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climate placed the South as a minority in a position vulnerable to
the current legislative program of the congressional majority. In
his opinion, "if there be no protective power in the reserved rights
rights of the States," the Southerners in the end would be forced
to rebel, or submit to having their permanent interests sacrificed,
their domestic institutions
reduced to wretchedness.

subverte~;

and themselves and children

25

Whatever may have been Calhoun's conscious objectives in
writing the ExEosition, there were three definite consequences relative
to his own political future.

Undoubtedly he had in mind Jefferson'·s

tactics of 1798 when the Republican leader; as a Vice President hostile
to the current administrati.on, s.ecretly wrote the Kentucky Resolves and
gained the presidency for himself two years later.

Calhoun needed to

undercut the strength of the radicals in his own state, to forestall
extreme action on their part.

He needed to encourage Southerners

to vote for Jackson, as v1ell as apply pressure on Jackscn1, after his
election, to reduce the tariff.

Extreme action by the radical hotheads

like Rhett or Hamilton, before the election in November, might have created
a situation that v1ould compel Jackson to comrili.t himself on the tariff,
and thus loose potentially crucial votes in the North or the South
!
. !

(The Vice President did temporarily "lvin the confidence of :t;.he Radicals,
while not losing support for

keepi~g

hi.s .penmanship a

secret~) ..

26

Calhoun had recognized the significance of the. votes cast by

25. Ibid.
26. Capers, op. cit., p. 119.

I
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Van Buren and Easton for. the amendment to the tariff of 1828.

27

He

feared that the General might forget his desire for tariff reduction
should it appear unpopular withthe majority wing of his party or with
the general public.

Here Calhoun may have been building a backfire.

He desired and encouraged the threat of independent action in South
Carolina for tariff reduction with

the expectation that Jackson's

fear of alienating Southern support, or possibly of civil \-Tar, would
influence him to force a lower tariff through Congress regardless of
Northern opposition.
The political strategy of the nullification proposal, written
secretly and \-Tithout comment at the moment, might have been a sort of
trial balloon and at the same time insurance against an unpredictable
future.
In February 1829, South Carolina presented a formal protest to
Congress ·which:

emphasized that all tariff acts were unconstitutional

except as incidental to raising the revenue or regulating commerce; and
charged all tariffs as politically aQ.d economically unequal, l-lhere
their operation and impact would oppressive aspects for all sections
of the country.

28

The language of the paper \vas respectful and dignified, moderate but forceful, with no threats of disunion, violence or unlawful
restrictions.

The message foll.O'I·md the clues presented in the

Jix.J?osition i.n considering alternative channels of power:

a

nev1

coalition with the Democratic party, a switch in party alliances,
the formation of a ne\-T party, the hope of Calhoun becoming President,
the use of the Courts, or the change in the cabinet membership.
::.

-----·----27. Ibid., p. 123

o

28. Ibid., pp. 120-122 •.
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The !xpostition vJas ;follovred in tactics as well as philosophy.
In discussion political remedies, Calhoun has stated:
No government based on the naked principle that the
majority ought to govern, hovrever true the maxim in its
proper sense, and under proper restrictio29' can preserve
its liberty even for a single generation.
To moderate tariff systems for revenue, affording incidental
protection, the South would agree:
We have suffered too much to desire to see others
afflicted, even for our relief, v1hen i t can be avoide_:d_-•:___________
He 'vould rejoice to see our manufacturers flourish on
30
any constitutional principle, consistent with justice.
Which to Calhoun· '"as the binding element of the Constitution.
Here vlaS the crux of the matter.
could act with great injustice.

A :uniform la"t-7 for the whole nation
Alexander Hamilton had understood.

Society, the great Fedet"alist leader

had written, must not only

"guard against the injustice of the other part ..... If a majority be
united by a common interest, the ••• minority will be unsafe."

31

Only those governments 'vhich check power, which limit and
restrain within proper bounds the po;.rer of the majority, have had
a prolonged and happy existence.

Like Hadison responding to the

Shay's Rebellion, so Calhoun sought to control a majority which passed
a tarlff which he conceived as making the South "serfs of the
system."

32

It was a constitutional means short of secession, for

resisting the majority took the form of state nullification.

With

careful logic, in order not to repeat the "governmental partners

-------------------29. Ibid., p. 123.
30. James Nadison, "The Federalist Number LX," The Federalist,
ed. Jacob E.. Cooke (Cleveland, Heridan Books, 1961), pp. 403-401~ .. - - ·
31~

Ibid., P• 408c

32. Ibid.
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in compact" mistakes of the 'Hebster-Hayne debates, the Exposition
showed the powers of sovereignty belonging entirely to the several
states therefore the right of judging whether measures of policy
-v1ere infractions of their rights under the Constitution belonged
to the states.

When a state convention, called for that purpose,

decided that constitutional rights were violated bY any statute, the
state had the right to declare the law null and void lV"ithin its
boundaries and to refuse to permit its enforcement

there~

Nullification

'"ould be binding on both the citizens of the state and the federal
government.

Here the state was the intermediary agency which held

and distributed power.
In his position as Vice President Calhoun removed himself
directly from the happenings in South Carolina but indirectly, as the
anonymous singner of the Exposition 2 he tried to guide a moderate
course, a compromise similar to the agreement achieved in the 1790's
between the coastal area and the uplands of South Carolina.
Salient to Calhoun's

politic~l

process was a desire not

to be pressured into systematicaaly opposing the North4
Our true system is to look at the country and to
support such measures and such men, -v.Jithout regard to
section as ~~e best calculated to advance the general
interest •••
In 1816 Calhoun's strategy was compromise, for the sake of the
Union. Advocating the tariff bill in 1816, Calhoun said it would_
"bind together our >·Tidely spread Republic .. 11

At the same time he

war-ned against disunion. · "This single 'tvord comprehends almost

33. Wiltse, op. cit., pp. 163-165.
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the sum of our political dangers, and against it ••• we ought to be
perpetually guarded."

34

Calhoun left no doubt as to his meaning.

Despite his later

concession to a "small permanent protection,".he was -supporting the
newtariff as a gesture of unity and concession, from a·positiqn of
strength, for the nation and not for South Carolina.

He was con-

vinced the tariff would bring a harmonious balance to the.great
interests of the country.

35

Calhoun's objective and fear in 1816

l·Tere the objectives of a life time.

His goal was constant:

to preserve the union, and to hold back all forces which might send
the union apart. ·Twelve years later he withdrew his support for a
tariff bill for it, he felt, was designed to do the reverse.

His

tactics had changed, not his strategy.
In 1816 Calhoun had probably supported Monroe with little
thought to the sectional question (He was only thirty-six and six
full Presidential terms would have to pass before he would reach
the average age at lvhich the office

h~d

up to that time been filled.) ..

Immediately following his appointment as Secretary of Har, he '·Tas
made a\vare in cabinet meetings that John Q. Adams and W:U.Ham H.
Crawford lv-ere already candidates for the election of 1824.

36

Adam's

unpopularity in the South was not changed by his stance on the
Missouri Compromise; thus it would be difficult for him to poll
strength to carry that section in the next election.

The election of

another Southerner, particularly one of Crawford's radical posture, would

35. Coit., op. cit., p. 114.
36~

Wiltse, op. cit., p. 225.
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alienate the North further and possibly create the dangers of

1814~

Calhoun, having been New England trai.ned, knew as well as any man
ho"l-7 deep-seated was the feeling of the North and East aga'inst the long
line of Southern Presidents.
In correspondence with William Plumer, Jr., a personal friend
of both Calhoun and Adams, Calhoun stated that for years he had been
in favor of giving the North the next Presidency, leaving the North
to select the man.

His trip through the Northern and Middle Atlantic

of most northern countrymen.

To Plumer he also expressed his. o\m

preference for the candidacy of Mr. Adams.

Calhoun described Adams

as a man. of talent, of integrity and correct political opinion.

At

this time, Calhoun inquired if Adams had the support of united
forces of the North, which would be necessary for his cause, given
the antagonism in the South.

36

During the Congressional debates in late 1821 it appeared
Ada.ns increased his unpopularity in New England and would be deserted by New York and Pennsylvania.

37

At the same time Crawford

was gaining strength in the Niddle States and might secure a majority,
given more time.

After consultation with his advisors, Calhoun de-

clared his candidacy, then again corresponded "YTith Plumer.

He asked

that Adams be informed that his candidacy \·las to split the South, to
defeat the upsurge of Cra\·Tford.

38

Calhoun was probably not only moti-

vated by his belief that the North should have the Presidency 5.n

36. Ibid., p. 245.
37. Ibid., p. 243.
38. Ibid., p. 223.
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but also a desire to stop the personal Presidential plans of Crawford
(Jackson had not declared his candidacy and Calhoun felt Clay would
have little impact.).

Galhoun had been at odds with Crawford since

he interferred with certain military bills Calhoun as Secretary of
Har v1anted passed by Congress in 1817.

39

Thus having assisted in what he conceived as the political
process of retaining the Union in 1814-1816, and 1821-1824 by
compromising with the North, and having suffered defeat by a numerical
-------.m-<1 jo!"-i-t-y-l.n-both-Hou.ses-of-Cong-!"ess-'·T-i-th-the-'I'a-!"-i-f-f-of-Abomina-t-ion-,-----.

Calhoun turned in late 1828 to the Presidency, and. the Constitution
for assistance in the protecting of minority group interests,
sectional and economical, and preserving the Union.

Calhoun turned

to General Jackson to reinforce the Southern position.
Early in the campaign Jackson's advisors had pressed him to
be discreet so as not to make difficulties for sectional leaders of
the party.

The object w·as to insinuate the General as a friend

on the East of protection, on the 'Hest as a Federal road and canal
advocate, and on the South as a very mild tariff and improvements
man.

The strategy proved effective as revealed through the ambiguities

in the response to his first inaugural address.

In the address Jackson

promised nothing, except to clean house among the Federal officeholders.
He advocated no policy, and the host of special interests could read
into the address whatever they desired when Jackson promised not to
confuse the delegated power of the federal government with the reserved rights of the states.

39. Ibid., p. 179.

He called for:
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The i.ntroduction and observance of the strictist economy •••
a Judicious tariff, combined with a fostering care of commerce
and agriculture, and regulated by the principles before adverted to, a just respect for state rights and the maintainance of state sovereh§nty as the best check of the tendencies
to consolidation ••• ~
.
·
The editor of the Charleston Nercury said the President would:
uphold the states ••• in their just power, sedulously
avoiding encroachment on their rights. He will regard the 41
preservation of the Union as the polar star in his conduct.
And Calhoun on September 22, 1829, stated, "That Jackson is in
principle true to the groun on "l'lhich he was elected. n

42

With regard to a proper selection of the subjects of
impost with a vie>V' to revenue, it '\'Tould seem to me that the
spirit of equity, caution, and compromise in 'vhich the
Constitution Has formed requires that the great interests
of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures should be equally
favored, and that perhaps the only exception to this rule
should consist in the peculair ecouragement of any products
of either of s~em whi.ch may be found essent:i.al to our national
independence.
Jackson's message to Congress on December 8, 1829, did not
prove itself so beneficial to the manufactures or so injurious to
commerce and agriculture as had been anticipated.,

The existing

schedule of duties, he declared, had proved less beneficial to the
manufacture than had been hoped, and less harmful to agriculture
and commerce than had been feared.

He regretted all nations would

not abolish tariff but since they did not, a tariff 't·ms necessary
policy of the United States.

Jackson suggested a gradual reduction

l~O. John s .. Bassett (ed.,), Corr~..PE.:1dence of Andre'tv Jackson,
IV (Washington: Carnegie Institute of \-Jashington, 1929), p~ 13.

41. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 46.
42. Ibid.,

p~

43. Anderson,

112.
op~

cito, p. 437.
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of duties on articles not coming into competition with domestic products,
e.g., tea, coffee.

Jackson could not and had not avoided the tariff

issue in his address but approached the tariff controversy with
extreme caution.

l~4

South Carolina was disappointed by the expression of the
President's view for some Southern politicians felt the promised
return for its votes in the 1828 election had not been fulfilled.

45

The President had recommended noting that in the long run could be

In addition
choices.

Cal~oun

;.,ras disappointed by Jackson's cabinet

Cabinet apointees reflected sectional and econom.ic

interests.

Calhoun view·ed Jackson as not reponding to the major

coalitions within the Democratic Party, for Jackson appeared to
to respond more to Crmvford' s southern influence in his choice
of nominations than to Calhoun's.
JEFFERSON MEHORIAI, DINNER
. AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS

Andre'ir Jackson 1 s toast at the Jefferson Day Memorial Dinner,
April 13, 1830, presented not only a challenge but a rebuke to Calhoun:
the "Federal Union ••• mu.st be preserved. 11

An evening set aside to honor

Jefferson, the spiritual father of the two highest elected public
officials in the United States, >ms the only

.E.~

encounter bet>-;een

them over the tariff issue during those controversial years.

44. Ibid., pp. 435-441.

45. Ibid., p. 47.
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The strategic responses made that evening by both revealed
differences in polit:i.cal

sty~es,

personal ambitions, controversies

over the nature of the Union, and the role of minority groups.
Jacksons 1 s response '\'ras a moral d:i.rective, forthright,· and stated
with confidence, of the force to attain the stated goal.
Jackson and Calhoun were caught on a tidal wave of change in
Amer:i.can political development.

Jackson moved with the wave of

nationalism, '•Tith Calhoun caught in the undertow of state rights.
Each used the Jeffersonian image as a theoretical base and as a tool
of persuasion for the validity of assuming the political mantle of
leadership, i.e., Jackson -- COimnon man, Calhoun -- state rights.
And the Jacksonian moral polemics in the campaign of 1828 ripened the
sense of the past in the deepening party struggle.

Both ideas were

part of Jefferson's basic philosophy but in that era of transition,
and in direct response to the tariff situation, the political commitments became countervailing forces.

The double image pointed to the

ironic recognition that the father of the symbolic creed \'lhich
shielded the South and the father of.the symbolic creed which
threatened to destroy it \vere one and the same.
Calhoun's response supplied a significant qualification to
Jackson's toast, revealing ambiguity and humility, but firmness.
The Union -- next to our liberty most dear.
Nay •·m always remember it can only be preserved by
distributing l(gually the benefits and the burdens
of the Union. ~

46. Glyndon G., VanDeusen, The Jacksonian Era (Ne'\'T York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 45.
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The qualification v1as consistent with his political actions and
political philosophy, and it' appeared to be an exact logical statement of the principles advanced by Jefferson in 1798.
The state rights' and minority rights' premise was often refleeted in Jefferson's thoughts, primarily his early ones.

For example,

in 1797 he said;
All, too, ,,rill bear in mind this sacred principle that,
though the v1ill of the majority is in all cases to prevail,
that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; and that the
minority possess their equal rights, which equa)0 ._1_a_w_m_u__s_t_________
-----------.--rote-ct--,-awd~-o-v_i_o-la t--e-j:-t woul<rbe oppression. --And on August 23, 1799, he vTrote to Nadison:
Determined were we to be disappointed in the repeal
of the unconstitutional act by Congress to sever ourselves
from the union \'le so much value, rather than give up the
rights of self go~ernment w·hich we have reserved, gnd in
4
which alone '"e see liberty, safety and happiness.
In the crucial eighth resolution of Jefferson's original
draft of the Kentucky Resolutions vrere two sections later obmitted:
1. that every state has a natural right in most cases
with the compact to nullify, of their own authority, all
assumption of pm'l'ers by others ~·lithin their limits,

2. (that each state) will take measures of its o'·m
for proving that neither of these acts (the Alien and
Sedition Acts) nor any other of the General Government·
not plainly and intentionally authorized by the Constitution, shalA 9be exercised within their respective
•
•
f.
terr~tor~es ..
Jefferson~s

closing statement,

"Nullification • .,. is the rightful

remedy, 11 was incorporated in the Resohttion of 1799.

47., Hax Lerner, America .as a Civilization (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 151.
Lf8. Capers, op. cit., p. 13!~.

49. Herrill Peterson, The Jefferson Image in the Amerlcan Hind
(New York:

Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 57.
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No man may fairly be held accountable for all the t'l'listings
and turnings of his intellectual offspring; yet the meaning of an
idea reaches beyond its original context and purpose.
in history.

It is unfolded

Je.fferson 1 s state rights' doctrine afforded an i llumi-

nating instance.

It was capable of being appropriated for purposes,

possibly alien to his own, in any crisis of federal relations that
might arise; and the power of the Jeffersonian

symbol, combined with

the :memory of 1798, made it expedient to appropriate them.
Jackson's first year in office had ended with no indication
that he '1'7ould initiate legislation to lo'irer the tariff.

When NcDuffies 1

bill for reduction was tabled ''lithout discussion in February 1830,
certain South Carolina leaders decided that it was time to increase
the pressure on the administration by more drastic action.

An active

campaign began in the Hest, the South and in the state of South
Carolina to press for the support of nullification, or at least for
a program of concerted action rather than verbal protest.
was placed on "State Rights and Free Trade. 11

The emphasis

Some leaders in South

Carolina organized a radical party calling for a state convention
"where the people in their sovereign capacity should decide 'ilhat
ought to be done."

50

The radical party supporters lost a t>'7o-

thirds vote necessary for calling a convention in South Carolina
in the autumn of 1830G
The

\~ebster-Hayne

debate in the spring of 1830 was an

outgrowth of the introduction of the Foote Resolution.

Hayne

saw the opportunity for a political alliance between the South and
West directed against the tariff, and the restriction of land sales.

50. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 52.
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=

Webster adroitly centered the debate for nationalism against nulli".
fication, for union against disunion, thereby turning the sympathy
of a large majority of Hesterners and evenof Southerners, against
the radical proposals from South Carolina.
The Southern idea of null:!.fication was taken by Calhoun
and sharpened into an organic law of the federal system.
th~

enhance

image of nullification the best possible strategy was

to link the cause i'lith Jefferson.

Jefferson could serve as the

Nullifier 1 s armor of safety and flag of victory.
Nemoirs,

To

Cor._resE~~dence

In 1829 the

and Private PaEers of Thomas Jefferson made

their first appearance and the South sought to capitalize on them.
Some South .Carolinians in the bid for federal support in
1830 counted on the association of Jefferson's man.

Missouri

· Senator. Thomas Hart Benton (pro tariff) arranged the celebration of
Jefferson's birthday, anticipating it to become a party rite, an
annual

11

recurrance of fundamental principles, and a declaration of

adhesion to the republican doctrine of the great apostle of
American libertyo 11 Sl
Reverberations of the toasts

bounded off the federal

buildings 1 "alls for weeks following the dinner.

Both opposition

and administration spolcesm"ln at once turned Jackson's declaration
\

against South Carolina.

Some Southerners felt defeated by Jackson's

toast but the stigma of nullification ivas attached to Jefferson and
despite vigorous counterthrusts, despite Jackson, the impression
was planted and could not be v1holly rooted out.

51. Peterson, op. cit., p. 54.

::.
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With the disappointment in Jackson and the decreasing chance
of

executi~e

leadership for tariff reduction and lacking sufficient
~

votes in Congress despite continued efforts of men lik.e ·George McDuffie
(suggesting the tariff schedule as revenue should be placed in.the
hands of the National Committee on Hays and Means rather than the
Committee on Manufacturing which was chaired by John Q. Adams), Calhoun
turned to the courts for a constitutional interpretation :and to
another effort for executive support.
in referring to the Constitution
f or

.

. .

m~nor1.t1.es.

a~

He echoed James Hamilton Jr.

always having been

11

the refuge

,,52

In 1830 the case of Tassel.l, vs Georgia 1 the Supreme Court made
an exhaustive revie>-T of the Indian relations of the United States and
of provisions of the statutes of Georgia.

The Court asserted that.

the jurisdiction of the Conunom1ealth over the Cherokee lands and over
I

all persons residing or being on them, unconstitution, null, and voido

The Court upheld the arrest, trial and sentence of Cherokee Tassello
Hr. Worcester, a test case for state .rights, >·ms under a similar·.
indictment.

The state of Georgia authorities paid no attention to

the decision.

The President failed to see that the Court ruling

carried out.

The Commomvealth of Georgia simply defied the Court

'ilas

successfully; the President and Congress acquiesced in the revolt ..
The President agreed in opinion ,.,ith the Georgians upon the subject,
and the doctrine which here triumphed was one more plank in the
platform of the Jacksonian democracy, a real

11

stat.e rights" principle.

53

52. Charles H~ Hiltse, .Tohn_s_Calho~1: .Jiationalir~ 1782-1828
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 191+4), Po 290.

53. Ibid., pp. 310-312.
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Georgia had nullified a decision of the Supreme Court in the
first of the Cherokee cases,· and Georgia was still in the Union.
Pennsylvania had done likewise in the earlier Olmstead case, but
the Union still stood firm.

Why should the tariff and South Carolina 1 s

notion of nullification dissolve the Union?
Encouraged by the course of events in Georgia, South Carolina
embarked on a Rimilar case, hoping for similar results.

It did not

seem to have fully realized that President Jackson did not &gree with
them in their view of the unconstitutionality of the tariff as he
had agreed \>lith the Geor:gians in their view of the Indian question.
Sout.h Carolina politicans

~.,ere

unaware of certain personal

elements entering the decision-making process.
Calhoun

\'las

Jackson had assumed

his defender in the Court martial case and discouraged a

trial for disobeying orders or acting in excess of orders during the
Seminole War, and that Crawford was the instigatoro

In 1830 those

close to Jackson, Eaton, Van Buren, Governor Forsyth of Georgia,
convinced Jackson that it
him.

v1as

Calhoun who had pressed for arraigning

Jackson demanded an explanation of Calhoun but the reply did not

satisfy him.

Thus from this point on any movement against

th~

Government or the laws of the United States headed by Calhoun
~'/'ould

be considered by Jackson as rebellion.
On July 4, 183J.,two conventions

~vere

5{].

held in Charleston,

the South Carolina Union Party, and the South Carolina States'
Rights and Free Tariff Party.
Andrew Jackson
the meeting.).

vras

At the Union meeting, a letter from

read· (He had declined an invitation to attend

Jackson made clear by implication that any move to

54. Ibid., pp. 310-325.
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.nullify would be met by force.

The enlightened citizen should know

••• that high and sacred duties which must and will,
at a'll hazards, be performed, present an insurmountable
barrier to the success of any plan of disorganization by
whatever patriotic name it may be decorated, ~5 whatever
high feelings may be arrayed for its support.
Although he had sustained Georgia in her refusal to carry out
the Supreme Court's ruling in the Tassell case and had gone so far
as to withdraw the United States

t:r.~oops

from that state at -the demand

of Governor Gilmore, Jackson was preparing to take drastic action·
against the Nullifiers in South Carolina.

It cannot be unequivocally

demonstrated that the distinction arose out of his quarrel with Calhoun,
but i t is not unlikely.

The President had stated more than once that

only the Supreme Court could determine whether an act of Congress was
unconstitutional; but during the summer of 1831 he took great pains to
see that the constitutionality of the Tariff of 1828 did not get to
the Court for a decision.

The Holmes case, trumpted up by McDuffie for

i
the purpose of testing the law, was about to come to trial.

The de-

fendenats had refused to pay duty on certain imported goods on the
ground that the law was invalid.

The United States Attorney in

Charleston resigned rather than bring suit on the posted revenue
bonds.

Jackson's first inclination was to refuse the resignation

and impeach the officer, but he decided on merely to appoint a more
.
56
p 11ant prosecutor.

In the meantime he proposed to send a private

agent to look and inquire, and take the necessary testimony to expose
all \•Tho are engaged in

11

this act of intended treason against our

55. Charles M.. \Ultse, ~n C., c.~.lh__?_!!n: Nullifier, 1829-39
(Indianap_olis: The Bobbs-Herrill Company, ·1949), Po 112.
56. Ibid., p. 113.
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_Government."

57

Jackson had been informed that Calhoun positively

supported the activities and that was enough to convince him that the
Union was threatened.

James Ae Hamilton, Jr., who was then United States

. P,

Attorney of New York, gave Jackson detailed advice as to how the suit
might be managed to avoid sending it to a jury or, failing that, to
restrict the evidence to the single point of the validity of the
bonds.

58

The latter procedure was followed; the Nullifiers lost their

case, and with it all chance of getting a Supreme Court ruling on
59
the tariff.
The direct interference of the President in the affair
was not knom1 to the Nullifiers, but it was known to the Unionist
leaders, thus strengthening their hands in the South, as did their
clarification of the process of nullificationo
Of the twenty-four states in the Union in 1830, Delaware
the smallest, \'lith only half of one per cent of. the total population,
could arrest the operation of any law or treaty passed by Congress and
even set aside a decision of the Supreme Courto

Sh~ld

the majority

attempt to pass on amendments that would give constitutional sanctions
to a law previously nullified, the seven smaller states, containing eight
per cent of the total population could defeat the amendment.

° Few

6

Southern states would probably grant such tremendous power to such
a minority.,

Nany of them had benefited from legislation enacted by

slight majorities or had in mind future measures vital to thetr interests. -

57. Jameson,

op~

cit .. , p. 316.

58. Ibid., p. 322.

59. H. Niles and Son (ed.), !!_?.les YI~.k_l:;:, Regis~~' XXXV
(Baltimore: September 1828 to March 1829), pp. 119-124,.
60 .. Delaware, 76,748; Rhode Island, 97,199; Mississippi, 136,621;
Missouri, 140,455; Illinois, 157 ,445; Louisana, 215, 739; Ne\V Hampshire, 269,328.,
Their combined population was 1,093,535 out of a total of 12,866,000.
Capers, opo cit., p. 133.
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Nullification could "Tield a two-edge sword which would injure the
wielders no less than their opponents.

Thus it was possible the

Southern and Western states understood the basic point of nullification
and applied to it a reductio ad absurdum.
First of all, despite attempts by some Southern leaders in.l830
to gain passage of a compromise tariff, and secondly, to prove the
unconstitutionality of the existing tariff, they were given no quarter
by Jackson.

His second annual message to Congress asked for the

continuation of the present tariff.

Although the tariff might need

some corrections in detail, no law reducing duties could be made which
would be satisfactory to the American people.

Jackson's political

strategy would maintain the status quo for the South or isolate
them politically and economically.
Already a national hero by the time he was elected President,
Jackson became the great partisan protagonist of his time, Jackson
caused a great polarity of attitudes, for his contemporaries and subsequent scholars.
Andre"T Jaclcson was intimately identified '·Tith the full
flowering of American democracy, and as long as democracy
remains preeminently the distringuishing feature of our
society, the period and the symbol of its triumph "Till
remain controversial ••• the paradoxical character of the
·Jacksonian democratic impulse ••• (as) the frame of reference
has served a valuable purpose .... by leading historians
61
to the different elements of the complex Jacksonian past.
Jackson accepted the issue of executive power.
the President's conception of his

office~

It fitted

Jackson had been accused

of thinking of himself not as administering a government but leading

61. Charles Grier Seblern, Jr., "Andrew Jackson versus
The Historians, 11 The Hississip.Pi._Vall.cy His~ori.cal R~, XLIV,
No. t... (March 1958), pp. 615, 633.
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an army, which he called a party and which he confused with the
people.

62

van Buren revealed that Jackson yearned to lead in person

the 35,000 troops he ,.,as prepared to summon to march against the
South Carolina nullification in 1833 before the impasses vras
..

comprom~se

d • 63

An army did not compromise with its foes.

to extermination.
Jackson's mind.

It battled

Neither '"as there any halfvray house for loyalty in
One was for him or aga:i.nst him.

If -for him, one

obeyed orders without question; if against him one was a suspected
traitor.
Jackson 1 s political style represented one of presidential poiver
and aggressive leadership. a policy-making rather than a mere la-v1making official of government.

He exercised strong executive powers

vrhether dealing w·ith the legislature or judicial branches of government,
with friends or enemies or vrith other governments.

He vetoed tv1elve

Congressional bills and pocket-vetoed others, justifying the vetoes
>·lith the explanation that expedience was deemed efficient.

As

recipient of the mandate in 1828 he knevr better than either. the
Congress or the courts i·That Has good for the country and v7hat was
constitutional, e.g., the Cherokee cases, and the reported remark
"Justice :Narshall has made his decision, nmv let him enforce it, "
was exemplary of his style.

64

The cabinet was under his control, not

responsive to Congress, e.g., the position of Secretary of Treasury.
He, as opposed to calhoun, was a man \vho learned by dealing >·lith

62. Wiltse, op. cit., pp. 213-214.
63 .. \Hlfred Binkley, The Han in the Hhite House (Ne>·l York:
Harper and Row, 1958), p. 189-.---·64. Arthur 1'-l .. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age .?f Jackson (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1950), p .. 1~5.
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actualities rather than by intellectual analysis.

The complexity of

the Presidency has not easily lent itself to this posture but Jackson
often responded to issues in personal terms:
be considered against me."

11

who is not for me must

65

Jackson first strengthened the role of the Presidency by use
of the veto \·Jhich led to an acquisition of irreverence for the delicate
checks and balance process that vms developed by his predecessors.

66

Jackson vras the first to employ the veto against bills.that he

did not-- lik.e, irrespective of their presumed unconstitutionality.

67

His conviction v1as that the veto power was the w·eapon of an independent
and coordinate executive branch, to be exercised in judgment on both
constitutional and policy issues.

The veto afforded an occasion for a

show of force and an opportunity to formulate and articulate vie'i,7s
about the nature and breadth of presidential potqer.
The relationship of the chief executive, the bureaucracy and
the legislative body v1as slightly altered during Jackson 1 s administration.
The fact that he removed t'iV'O Secretaries of the Trea:sury because of
their refusal to execute his order to I·Tithdra\·7 funds from the Bank of
the United States, shov;s the increased strength in his position, and
his public support.

Congress tended to vie·w the operation of the

Treasury as partly under its control.

•

Although Jackson \·tas censored for

his activities, his image as public defender was not altered.

65. Ibid.
66. Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness (Neli< York:
1966), pp. 236-237.

Appleton-Ce~tury-Croft,

67. The veto power partially represents or responds in the
same manner as Perro\'1 1 s negative veto used by the pluralists.

i
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Freedom from any hard and fast social philosophy permitted
Jackson a flexibility as to policies that was to put him in the
front rank of American political leaders.

Instead of initiating

\·That came to be called Jacksonian Democracy, the already developing
movement by and large appropriated the General as its symbol and leader.

68

Jackson, by intuition, sensed the course the public mind >·lOuld take.
Thus he follm-md when he seemed to lead.

No doubt Jackson was like

most able political leaders, more or less unconsciously a pragmatic
opportunist.
Secondly, Jackson circled about him a .coterie of devoted and
expert politicans 'vho persistently sought the centripetal issues to
hold intact the Democratic group coaHtion.
became one of his enduring clain1s to fame.
as a party catalyst.

His kitchen cabinet
The body itself functioned

Jackson reorganized and renovated the Democratic

party and through the party structure

ina~sed

his control over Congress.

For example, the pm'ler of committee appointments >vas removed from the
hands of the Vice President (Calhoun). and placed in the hands of the
.
h y "nt
. h.~n t h e
party h ~erarc

s enate. 69

A third consideration of Jackson's presidericy and his personal
style was the use ·::>f the patronage device.

The development of

patronage cannot be attributed to Jackson, but he used it most
effectively as an instrument for institutional control and as a
tool for image building.

Through its pov1er, the President gained

a tool for the assertion of his will on the bureaucracy and enhanced

68. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 240-245.

69. Ibid., p. 219.
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his equipment for playing an energetic role in the control of governmental policy.

The control of the washington press and congressional

papers was a favorite target of patronage and political control.
Like Jefferson \>Tho took an active part in the establishment of
the National

Intell~gencer

in 1800 (The first President to have an

administration organ of his om1 choosing), Jackson realized the full
import of an administration press.

Jackson's vlctory had brought into

existence a new governmental organ published by Duff Green, the
~ed

States Telegraph.

contract.

Green also had acquired the Senate printing

Duff Green's support of Calhoun resulted in Green losing

the Senate contract, and the establishment of a new administration
mouth pience, the

.Glob~.

the Telegraph expired.

Green \>las eventually

fired~

and f:i.nally

70

A basic change which occurred was that the executive no longer
relied on the Cougress for office or po\·rer, but owed its alligence to
the people..

Of alLpublic officials, the President alone came to re-

present a national popular constituency (and nearest to resemble
the embodiment of an "American Hill 11 ) .

The President was the people's

representative-at-large and he should consequently uphold the
"People's Interest" against a sectionalized Congress.

In the

~

disputes with the Hhig party, Henry Clay, the Dank nulHHcation and
Calhoun, Jackson represented the

11

people., 11

His frontier and

military experiences provided force as the method of resolving conflict.
Jackson's personalization of issues meant diverting the hostility into
conflict, for change from means to object.

Thus seekl.ng channels for

-----·--------·~-------

70. Leonard lfuite, The Jacksonians
Company, 1966), PPo 263-264.

(Ne>·T York:

Hacmillan

i

I
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compromlse, bargaining, were made extremely difficult.

UnJ.ike

Jefferson and unlike Calhoun, Jackson "ms less concerned with
method than vlith reality.
Andrew Jackson represented the individual of native
forces >·Tho \·Jas able to transcend forms because he w'7I in
touch with the reality that gave the forms meaning.
11

The Bank is trying to kill me, but I v1ill kill

it.•.7 2

And >-lith this single-mindedness of an Apache, he pursued Biddle and
the Bank to the bitter end.

Jackson's alleged deathbed regret,

aprocryphal but in character, was that he had never had an opportunity
to shoot Henry Clay or hang John C. Calhoun.
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Hoven j_nto this stream of Jacksonian thought are several threads
of the Jeffersonian vision:

the friend of limited and frugal govern-

ment, equal rights and equnl la\v, strict construction and dispersed
pov1er, all as the defender of the Republic.

The political myth of

·Jacksontan Democracy formed around the ideas of return to the Jeffersonian
foundation and of continuing popular struggle in the image of Jeffersonian
politics.

Jefferson appeared not only as the sainted "Father of

Democracy" but also the symbol of a pure and noble way of life.

74

Most Jacksonians vTere intellectually and emotionally predisposed to
view their world through the Jeffersonian catego:.:-ies of government
and society, for Jefferson \vas considered the originator .of democracy

71. Hard, op. cit., p. 57.

72. Bailey, op. cit., p. 177.
73. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 40.

74. Ward, op. cit.,

p~

54.
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and Jackson the executor.

The three symbols-- the.Jeffersonian

symbol, Democracy, and the Democratic Party -- scarely existed in the
public mind apart from each other and attempts to disengage them
met with fleeting success.

75

Even Jackson believed the role he

played:
I have long believed, that it was only by preserving the
identity of the Republican party as embodied and characterized
by the principles introduced by Mr., Jefferson that the original
rights of the states and the people could be maintained as
contemplated by the Constitution. I have labored to reconstruct
this great party and bring the popular power to bear with full
influence u~gn the Government, by securing .its permanent
ascendency.

Jefferson thought is characterized by. a serious dualism
as a consequence of the attempt. to lay almost equal emphasis on
liberty and equality, on individual >-7elfare and the general interest,
which was at the heart of the conflict between Jackson and Calhoun
concerning the tariff issue.

Jefferson stood for absolute liberty

(natural rights) as well as for equality.

"The true foundation of re-

publican government is the equal "t'ight of every citizen ••• "

77 It is

upon the idea of equality which Jackson built his political platform,
reinforced by Jefferson's statement of dedication to nationalism of the
highest order:
The first object of my heart is my own countryG In that
is embarked my family, my fortune, and my oNn existence. I have
not on, 8farthing of interest, nor one fiber of attachment out
of it.
Jackson 1 s own presidential messages were ragged poli.tical
philosophy, tendentious accounting, crude policy..

Like many successful

75. Peterson, op. cit., p. 64.
76. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

77; Ibid., p. 312.

.
78. Russel B. Nye, This _Almost Ch<?_s_e_E_ Peo.E.le (East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1966), p. 64$
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Presidential candidates he entered office with no articulated,
comprehensive plan of action.

But his rhetorlc revealed:

An exhaustrive repertory of moral plots 'lflhich might engage
the political attention of the nineteenth-centruy Americans: ·
equality against privilege; liberty against domination; honest
work against idol exploit; natural dignity against factitious
superiorty; patriotic conservati7~ against alien innovation;
progress against dead precedent.
Jackson was a very personal individual leader, a national
hero, a great popular leader, a great party catalyst, and a great
public figure.

He had a powerful impact on the presidential office,

on his times, and subsequent times as revealed by Woodrow Wilson·
in an analysis of executive power.
He came into our national politics like a cyclone from off
the Western prairies. Americans of the pre$85t day perceptibly
shudder at the very recollection of Jackson.
·
In retrospect, Jackson provided t"Yip-fisted presidential
leadership, >vhich his enemi.es branded as capricious and dictatorial.
As a beneficiary of the Ne\'r Democracy, he led the

~vest

and the under-

priviledged in politics, and left the \olhite House more popular than
when he entered.
democrats.

He fought the plutocrats in the interests of the

He upheld the Union against the nullifiers of the South.

He overtipped the constitutional checks and balances in favor of the
executive.

In a sense he attempted to remake rather than to

survive the'presidential office.
THE TARIFF OF 1832 - THE SOUTH CAROLINA
NULLIFICATION - JACKSONJS FORCE BILL
The personal political styles of conflict regulation of

79. Meyers, op. cit., p. 10.
80. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 277-278.
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Jackson was one of command and persuasion ''lith power. 81

Calhoun's

strategies, style and rhetoric reflected compromise, factions and
bargaining with diversification of pov1er.

Jackson and Calhoun both

harkened to ITefferson's proclamation of unity as the highest national
goal.

But the diversity in human behavior challenged that goal.
As stated above, Shils captures the essence of pluralism in

his quote:
· Liberalism is a system of Pluralism. It is a system of
many centers of pov1er, many area's of privacy and a strong
internal impulse to>·rards the mutual adaptation of spheres,
rather than of 2he dominances or the submission of any one
8
to the others..
'
Calhoun's political style, political strategies and political
rhetoric has thus far reflected a process with many centers ·Of pow·er,
many areas of privacy, and ,;.lith a strong internal impulse to>vard
mutual adaptation of political spheres as well as attempts to counter
,.,hat he perceived as a grmving dominance by one interest and the submission of another.
Basic to Calhoun's strategic responses to the tariff conflict
were alternative routes to conflict representation in the political
arenao

When one proved .inaccessible, attempts were made to approach

another.
Calhoun

1

Systematically each branch of government was exposed to
s-st-1~a-tegy

to get a responsive hearing:

a modified tariff in

Congress; Jackson's executive influence for proposed reductions; the
Supreme Court appeal; and, resistence through the vehicle of the

81. The Appendix provides a chronological listing of the
major events in the development of the Jackson-Calhoun political conflict.
82. Shils., loc. cit.

I
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Democr.atic rarty.

Other alternative. considered \'Tere:

a separate

party (State Rights and Free Trade Party); a new coalition with the
West; and neutrality between the two parties; and, a considered coalition
with the Whigs.

Appeals were made via press and interest group coalition

for a dramatic moral impact (use of the Jeffersonian image).

As the

intensity of the conflict increased to Calhoun's strategic response
to the alternative constructs :i.n the "removable spheres" of the modern
state, he suggested a release for the dominated section by altering
a fixed porti.on of the "spheres of authority" by the tool of nullification.

The avenues let"t, beside changing the basic structural

premise of the community (the Constitution),

~.,ere

use of force or

Calhoun endeavored to achieve resolution through accommodation
that w·ould keep the conflict within manageable limits though policymaking seemed futile.

Thus 1832 has been projected as the year

.
C·a lh oun crosse d ·th e Ru b ~con,

.

mov~ng

f rom na t.~ona. ].~s
. t to nu 11'J. f.~er. 83

His tactics changed, his strategy remained the same.
In late 1831, Calhoun finally committed himself to open
support of his theory and the belief that the very preservation of
the Union hung upon an adequate solution to the problem of security
for the minorities.

For loyalty to a government depended upon the

security and progress of the governede .The only recourse was the
exercise by the states of their reserved right of nullifying acts
which exceeded the power delegated to the federal government.

83. Capers, op. cit., Chapter 9.

Re-
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cogition of the sovereign risht of the individual state to exercise
its suspensive veto would in most cases deter (a negative veto pm·mr)
the congressional majority from thrusting upon a helpless minority a
bill certain to be nullified.

On the other hand, a state for various

reasons 'wuld hesitate to apply its veto, and the operation· of certain
automatic factors "rould prevent its abuse.
Despite universal condemnation of the tariff :i.n 1828, only
after four years of strenuous campaigning did the Nullifiers succeed
in electing a legislature pledged to calling a nullifying convention·
in South Carolina.

When this conventJon met, ·the delegates provided

for a considerable delay before nullification vrould become effective,·
partly to give Congress a chance to yield and partly because they
feared a clash with federal authority.

The effective date was later

postponed an additional month, during 'vhich the tariff was reduced and
the nullification ordiance

>'las

,-;rithdravm.
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The very factors v1hich >·Tould check liberal use of the
nullifying power by the states -- the economic

d~sadvantages

of

separation from the Union, the danger of coercion, and the conflict
in the loyalties of citizens of the state -- would operate even more
strongly against a resort to secession ,.;ere nullification answ·ered by
a successful amendment to the Constitution.

But since the po.-;er to

nullify was derived from state sovereignty and the compact theory of
the Constitution, calhoun defended the

84. Ibid., p. 155.

eq~~lly

logical

powe~

of a

I
E

I
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state to secede.
Grm·ling emotional intensity and increased feeling of isolation
'\vithout cross references to counter them led to rigidity in the system,
shutting off possible areas of compromise.. Much depended upon the
cur~ent

interpretations of the President 1 s actions as indicative of his

ultimate positions on the tariff, and upon his attitude

to~1ards

nullif:i.cation should it finally be at·tcrpvted by the state.

In turn,

both Jackson 1 s action and that of South Carolina were influenced by
the response of her sister states, not merely to the theory of nullification, but to nullification as a fait

.~ccompli..

Never at any time during his first four years in office, in
fact not until he actually signed the tariff bill which passed Congress
in 1832, '\vas i t certain that Jackson would not force a drastic tariff
reduct:i.on.,

He was generally regarded in the Hest and the South as an

advocate of state rights.

By his veto of the internal improvement

bill in 1830 and the bank bill of 1832 he positively committed himself
to strict construction.

In his various messages, he was vague on the

tariff, perhaps deliberately.
As long as the income from custnm duties was applied to payment of the debt, the tariff remained technical:'.y a revenue measure
difficult to challenge on constitutional grounds.

In answer to

South Carolina 1 s ordiance of nullification, Jackson's proclamation
of December, 1832, made clear his intention to compel obedience to
federal laws.
Would South Carolina's sister states, even though they rejected
the theory of nullification, actually permit the President to coerce

94
South Carolinae

Here they willing to risk a civil

''~'ar?

tvould Jackson

carry out his drastic proposals of coercion if the cooperation of a
majority of states or even of the Southern states was doubtful?
Had Jackson been able to carry out the degree of tariff reduction promised to the South Carolina Unionists in his message of
December, 1831, the nullification movement in that state would probably
have died a natural death and the above question avoided, for the
present.

The prospects of such an outcome increased v1hen the President,

towards the end of his first term appeared to favor the policy~advocated
for some time by a tvest-South alliance, of combining cheap land

"~<lith

tariff reduction as an effective means of preventing a surplus in the
treasury.

In the summer of 1832 this plan "t·Tas defeated in Congress by

Clay and his followers, who presented Jackson instead with a tariff,
still protective in principles, \·7hich he dared not veto .-.rith the
presidential election upon him.
The President's annual message to Congress in 1831 had contained
~

much more distinct and decided recommendation for the reduction of duties
than he had ever before expressed.

He called attention to the prospect

of reducing the public debt, when the annual installment to the sinking
fund "t·70uld be no longer needed, and recommended that Congress should at
once deal
"~<There

~ith

the question of the reduction of the duties to a point

they would produce no more revenue than would be necessary for

an economical administration of the government.

He further recommended

the readjustment of the duties '·rith a vielJ to equal justice to all
national interests, and said that the interests of both merchant and
manufacturer required that the change should be in better balance •

. 85. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 84-90.
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The cleavage of the tariff controversy by then was moving beyond
the point of rational discussion.

Intelligent men on each side thought

those on the other side '\'7ere bent on destruction, and each side thought
the other willfully, rigidly, and maliciously vrr.ong.

Many, perhaps

most, of the members of Congress, and innumerable plain citizens the
country over, thought the contest had gone far enough and that it \V"as
time for compromise; but everyone wanted the concessions to come from
interests other than the one he particularly represented.
erent·~

The bellig-

attitude of South Carolina, only stiffened the resistence to

change on the part of the manufacturing states.

By 1834 tlfe charge

of the Jackson press, through constant repetition, had begun to assume
the outward aspects of truth; and Northern men who might have been
receptive to compromise began to belie~e that the Southe~n doctrines
actually were intended to rationalize separation of the slave state

.

f rom t h e Un1on.
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At a time >'lhen the highest statesmanship was needed,

an issue that threatened the very existence of the nation was made a
matter of partisan and -sectional politics.
Among those who \vere convinced at the start of the seeion that
the tariff must be reduced vms John Q. Adams, chairman of the House
Committee on Nanufacturing.

Adams maintained that the duties should

stand until after the payment of the public debt, and in this he met
no objection from Calhoun..

In fact, the South and Calhoun regarded

Adams on their side and commended him for it.
Adams 1 bill reduced duties on the average to the level of 182Lk
and deleted most of the "abominations 11 of 1828, but since reductions

86. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 135.
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were almost exclusively on noncompetitive items it v1as in essence more
.
87
purely protective than any previ.ous measure.
It received, neverthe less, a majority of the Southern votes, including those of three
South.Carolina congressmen.
The other eight members of the South Carolina delegation joined
in an unanimous statement to their constitutents on the day before
Jackson signed the measure:
Convinced that all hope of relief from Congress is irrevocably
gone, they leave it vTith you, the. sovereign power of the State,
to determine \·lhether the rights and liberties 't-7hicl1 you revie\·led

as a precious inheritance from an illustrious ancestry, shall
be tamely surrendered withog§ a struggle, or transmitte:_d undimished to your posterity.
The Tariff of 1832 \vas obviously a critical incident in a
complex chain of causation.

It did not logically justi.fy the drastic

and dangerous resort to nullification to either most of its contemporaries
or to posterity.

The majority of South Carolinians, however, aroused to

frenzy, saw their situation in an entirely different light.
garded their state
and allegiance.

~s

They re-

a nation to which they gave their whole loyalty

And it was under attack.

On the 1\rhole, i t

\<TaS

doubtfui i f the bill, 1vith the changes

imposed upon i t by the Seante, lvould prove to be any relief to the
South.

Nany of the Southerns claimed that i.t: would increase the burden

upon that section, while none of them appeared to think it would
lighten the burden.
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Hhat no1·1 were the planters to do?

vmited for the abolition of the debt, and for the period

87. Capers, op. cit., p.

89. Ibid.

151~

They had
''~'hen

the
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TJ;"easury v10uld no longer require the sixteen million dollars per
annum applied to its cancellation.

But instead of this, they were

now offered as a final solution of the 'tariff question, a slight
reduction of duties on articles coming into competition w:tth home
products, a partial abolition of the duties on those

~vhich

did not

come into competition with home products, and an increase in the
expenses of the government to the amount of the receipts,. whatever
they might be.
Long before the victory of the Nullifiers in the state election,
Calhoun had outlined in detail their strategy and the reason for their
confidence in its success regardless of strong opposition.

Once

South Carolina had nullified the tar:i.;Ef ·lal'rs by formal a.ct:i.on, the
only recourse of the protectionists \vould be to call a convention of
the states to pass upon an amendment granting the power in question to
the federal government.

The Unionists had proposed that the state

delay action until such a convention hadbeen called.
argued Calhoun, South Carolina must interpose first,

On the contrary,
as it is only

by such action that a necessity of acting on the subject could be
imposed· on the other States, and without such necessity, nothing
v10uld be done.

90

The involved events of the crisis during the several rnonths
following the passage of the ordinance can be simplified by citing
certain facts of basic significance.

South Carolina never actually

interfered with the collection of the duties.

Nullification was only

threatened a.nd iva.s not put into actunl execution at any time.

90. Ibid., p& 156.
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state

yie~ded,

obj~1ctive

said the Nullifiers, because she had accomplished her

when Congress passed Clay's bill for a gradual reduction of

the tariff.
In view of their earlier repeated assertions that recognition
of their right of nullification was their major purpose, and of their
later threats to secede if the Force Bill should pass, the outcome was
a-definite defeat for Calhoun and his colleagues.

They used the

compromise tariff as a face-saving excuse for the surrender of their
original objectives.

Every southern state, even Virginia, rejected

nullification as contrary to the Constitution.

By unmistakable words

and acts Jackson prepared to use force against the state the moment
overt interference with the collection of duties was attempted.

His

request for specific congressional authorization of coercion was
almost unanimously approved in the Seante by a vote of 32 to 1.

91

Faced with the certainity of armed resistance from the large
minority of Unionists at home and of invasion by a large force of
militi.a from without, and doubtful of military aid from other
southern states, South Carolina chose an avenue of accepting a
partial concession ori the tariff.

Through an alliance vlhich Calhoun

arranged with Clay, South Carolina was spared the b5.tter indignity of
being seen as yielding to Andrevl Jackson -- at the price of waiting
ten years for a reduction in the tariff e'qual to that which the
Verplanck Bill at the outset had offered.

92

South Carolina 1 s course ,.,as influenced by the tremendous pressure

91~

Ibid., pp. 160-165.

92. Ibid., pp. 171-173.
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on the Nullifiers resulting from the positive steps taken by the
President i.n the interim to meet their challenge.

Never an enthusiast

for protection, in recent messages he had advocated a reduction of the
tariff to a revenue basis.

In his message of December 4, 1832, he again

made such a recommendation, indicating his dissatisfaction with the bill
of the previous summer ·which he had signed.

Later in the month, he

consented to the introduction of a measure by Congressman Culian

c.

Verplanck of New York for a series of reductions until rates reached
an average of betv1een fifteen and twenty per .. cent by 1834.

Thus he

effectively reverse the South Carolina strategy of translating
anti-tariff sentiment into pronullification sentiment; by
eliminating protection as an issue he reduced the controversy to

\:"·'!>,·

:o

··.

-···

the essential question of the right of the state to annul an act
of Congress.
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In his proclamation of December 10, 1832, he had thundered
defiance to the heresy of his native state in clear and forceful words:
I consider, then, the pm-1er to annul a law of the United
States, assumed by one state, incompatible with the existence of
the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution,
unauthorized by its spirit •••• The Constitution ••• forms a government
not a league •••• Those who told you that you might peaceably
prevent (the execution of the laws) deceived you -- they could
not have been deceived themselves •••• Their object is disunion;
94
but be not deceived by names; disunion by armed force is treason.
Jackson was not one to rely upon vmrds alone.

Since early

autumn he had maintained close contact by letter v7ith Joel Poinsett,
leader of the Unionists in the state, and had taken numerous steps
to strengthen federal forces around Charleston.

It was his original

plan, as soon as he received official proof that the legislature had

93. Richardson, op. cite, pp. 653-657.
94. Capers, op. cit., p. 158.

100
military measures, to call upon the governors of certain states for ·
sufficient militia to enforce the tariff laws.
The determination of Jackson to suppress overt nullification
by force frightened friends and opponents, and all neutral parties as
well.

It produced a dual effect of winn)_ng votes from protectionists

as the.only means of avoiding civil war and of placing the Nullifiers
under pressure they could no longer bearo

95

All the parallel

developments -- the prospect of invasion, the adverse response of
Southern states, the compromise efforts of Virginia, and Congressional
consideration of the Verplanck Bill -- sobered the1n into strategic caution.
Early in the crisis the scene in l.Jashington focused upon the
personal battle between the President and Calhoun for the support of
the Senate.

calhoun Is response to Jackson's Force Bill

'ilBS

given

from the floor of the Senate arid not from·· the position of Vice President.
In December, the Nullifiers recalled Hayne from the Senate and
elected him to the governorship and the legislature chose Calhoun
to fill the vacancy thereby created.

Thus Calhoun became the first

nationally elected officer to resign his position in the United States.
Despite his positive convictions and his powers of logic, the
new Senator faced almost insurmountable obstacles.

Events made clear .

that South Carolina \<Tas isolated and the President w·as not bluffing.
What alternatives were left?

For fifteen years Calhoun had not indulged

in public speaking, yet his chief antagonist in the Senate debate by
\'lhich the outcome of the contest might 'lvell be determined l•Tas cer.tain
to be Webster, ablest orator of the day and ardent supporter of Jackson's

95. James Parton, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson (Nevi York:
Harper and Row, 1967), p. 359.
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bold stand for federal supremacy.

Regarded by many of his·fellow

citizens as a traitor and by most of them as chiefly responsibie for
the ugly crisis at hand, Calhoun lvas facing political ruin~

Upon

his actions depend~d, in no sm~ll degree the fate of his native
state and his nation.
Surely he v1as consulted in advance in regard to the suspension·
of the nulHfication date by the Charleston meeting on January 21; it
is not improbable that he suggested the move himself.

Assuming that

the Verplanck Bill then before Congress ,.1ould pass, the Nullifiers
could claim victory by asserting that their action alone had at last
brought about the reduction and that they had voluntarily called off
their plan to nullify.

At the same time the indefinite suspension of

the date made federal use of force unnecessary, and would encourage the
rejection by Congress of the Pres:i.dent's request (Force Bill).
But Jackson did not permit Calhoun and his colleagues to retreat
,.,ith such impunity.

South Carolina had raised the issue by formal

action; it ;oms by equally formal repudiation of the right of a state
.to annul a federal law.

He insisted upon his Force Bill to make i t

clear that federal authority was supreme and that the government had
not been intimidated in the slightest.

In South Carolina secession

was threatened if the bill passed Congress.

Calhoun told the Senate:.

If it were approved and an attempt be made to enforce it,
it would be resisted, at every hazard -- even that of death
itself. Death is not the greatest clamity: there are others
still more terrible to the free and brav§~ and among them may
be placed the loss of liberty and honor.
Calhoun replied to the Force Bill on the Senate floor "Tith

96. Anderson, op. cit., p. 112e
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three resolutions which summarized his contentions as to the nature of
American government..

Briefly, these asserted that the people of the

United States had never formed and did not compose a nation; that the
states alone were sovereign; and, that they t::etained the sole allegiance
of thej.r citizens as well as the right .to decide the powers 1..rhich they
had reserved to themselves and those \'Thic;,hthey had delegated by the
compact of the Constitution.

Had .the, Senate acted favorably on these

resolutions, the Force Bill vrould have been defeated in advance, but
various contrary resolutions v1ere at once introduced.
majority voted for the priority of the bill itsel£.

Shortly a

97

After much jockeying for position between the principals, in
the middle of February the great debate bet•1een Hebster and Calhoun
began.

Resorting to the closest legal and historical reasoning, each

contestant refuted the other, and ended as they began with irreconcilable
premises.

In a tone of dignity and sincere conviction Calhoun defended

in detail both his ovm actions and those of his state;

South

98
.
h a d not acte d ras hl y but h e:r: sJ.ster
.
Caro 1 ~na
states tar d.l
1. y.
listened respectfully but remained obviously unconvinced..

s enators

1-lh<m the

final vote on the measure \vas taken on February 20, Calhoun and other
states righters dramatically vTithdre1v, leaving John Tyler of Virginia
to cast the single negative vote.
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At the beginning of Harch both the Compromise Tariff and the
Force Bill vrere finally approved by both houses of Congress and Jackson

97. Ibid., pp. 115-120.
98. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 311.
99. Burgess, op. cit., Pe 262.
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signed the measure..

But the compromise tariff did not provide for

swift reduction to a revenue basis in t:l'm years.

Reduction was to

proceed slowly for eight years, then rapidly durine the next tvro.
Calhoun had abandoned his attempt to remove ... some of the objectionable
provisions of the bill Hhen Clay threatened to let him "fight it
out with the General Government .. "lOO
Actually Calhoun had no alternative to the subtle strategy vrhich
he followed.

Otherwise both he and South Carolina would have suffered

the humiliation of subject surrender to Jackson or almost certain defeat
in a military conflict.

As i t turned out, the state proudly claimed

a significant victory, while Calhoun received its adoration as the hero
who had worked the magic.

Moreover, as an immediate consequence

in the practical politics of the movement he had robbed Jackson and
Van Buren of credi.t for tariff r.educt5.on which would have strengthened
their following i.n Southern states in the upcoming election.
The controversy vms the climax of Calhoun's career, and its
various consequences fixed the pattern of his political future.
Independent state action had proved impractical, he spent his remaining years in an effort to unite the \vhole South into a political
bloc, trying at the same time other strategies by vrhich he hoped to
protect Southern rights and thus preserving the Union.

The virtue

of nullification, to his mind, had been the fact that it \<TOuld
accomplish both these objectives..

Not until 1850, the year of his

100. Capers, op. cit., p. 161.
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death,

~·1hen

the South 'I'Tas fighting a losing battle against legislation

fatal in his opinion to her security, did he reluctantly sive
ser i ous

"d erat~on
•
to

cons~

.

secess~on.
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GHAPTER V

9ALHOUN:

PLURALIST

Calhoun believed in language for \vhat i t could
do rather than for lvhat it vms, and this belief later
became the core of his political philosophy.
Hargaret CoH

).'he often unseen and undetected casues \vhich \vork deep
within society became Calhoun's concern.

He conceived his theoretical

problem to be the understanding of the relation of political order
to those often hidderi. social causes.

Undoubtedly Calhoun's political

theory served to explain and justify, to rationalize, his practical
efforts on behalf of the South.

It \vas also a rational construction

which dealt vrith an aspect of society often neglected in political
thought.

His acute observation of social facts extended beyond the

harsh conflicts of sectional patterns to the "tendency to conflict in
the North bet\veen labor and capital, wh:i.ch is constantly on the increase., 1•12
to the conflict produced by banking and financial interests, and to
the realities of social life in frontier communities, mining towns
and eastern cities -- indeed, to all the different interest, orders,
classes, or portions, into which the commun:i.ty may be divided. 113

(Boston:

1. Hargaret Coit, John C.. Calhoun: American PortraH
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 30.

2. John Anderson, Calhoun: Basic Documents (State College,
Pennsylvania: Bald Eagle P~r;;;s, ":19sz-r;-p-~·1i;:--3. John C. Calhoun, A Disquisit.:i.on on Government, ed. C.
Gordon Post (Nmr York: Libct:"a1Ar"t7-P~e-~-~--;-l9-53) ,-p:-25.
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Thus his understanding of the complex issue of minority relatlons.
which actually structured society, an understanding stimulated by
his allegiance to the cultural minority of the South, provided the
fundamental theme in his restatement of political theory.
calhoun had been defeated in his fight against the tariff
by the single power of the minority, and so it was the legitimacy of
that power which he called in question.

Government by a numerical

majority, unrestrained by any power on the part of the minority
interest to protect themselves 1 was as absolute as any dictatorship;
and could by legal means destroy all opposition.

Constitutional

government was a system which set up some other pmver to balance that
of the numeri.cal majority..

The basis for this balancing power Calhoun

found in Madison's organization of society into interest groups,
arising from diversity of pursuits or conditions.
To note the threat of the growing Northern majority to the
Southern minority was to observe the obvious~

To deal with this

threat as effectively as Calhoun did against the tide of circumstances
was a political achievement.

To point out that this was potentially

a threat to all minorities, rooted in a misidentification of the
political orde~ with a part of the social order, and to suggest,
moreover, a conception of political order \'lhich, in principle, m;i.ght
recognize minority groups was .a primary intellectual achievement.
A true political unity must be one able:
••• to cause the different interest, portions, or order
as the case may be -- to desist from ~ttempting to adopt
any measure calculated to promote the prosperity of one,
or more, by sacrificing that of others; and thus to force them
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to unite in such maasures only a.s would promote the
pro~perity of all.
Calhoun thus came to conceive the function of political order
as "intended to protect and preserve society" in all its aspects.

5

He could not regard as true a conception of political order impotent
to deal with the real diversity of American social life unless
imposed despotically upon some of its

11

elements. 116

And he accepted

the responsibility of his dissent from the simple political uniformity
of nationalistic tradition.

He formulated and offered to the American

people a political philosophy >·Ihich sought to relate political unity
to the diverse productions of human force and aspiration, the complex
of contrary and conflicting mements and intensions which in fact
constituted American life.
The pluralist vision is present in this philosophy as it
had been a political process for Calhoun in approaching the tariff
controversyo

Pluralism itself is undeniably

a

contradiction in terms.

Sovereignty by the very nature of the concept cannot be divided,
though it may be delegated.

Pluralism as a concept must be modified

to fit the nature of the modern state or the state itself must be
redefined in terms 't-Ihich leave some measure of autonomy to its component
elements.

It is this task >'lhich Calhoun undertook.

In all governments

in \'lhich i.nclividuals are free calhoun. found a va.riety of lesser
organizations through '\vhi.ch the v1ills of different groups \-Tere

4. Ibid., p. 38.
5. Ibid., p .. 7.
6. Ibid .. , p.

l1-0.

i

108

expressed, the >.;rill of the community as a whole being compounded
by these group \'Tills.

The exercise of sovereign power by such govern-

ments were conditional upon the concurrence of each of these group
'tdlls.

Where interest differed, only t>-ro courses were open:

Coercion and

compromise~

Any government resorting to coercion as

an absolute, its citizens ceased to be free.

7

The doctrine of the

c.oncurrent majority is., therefore., a thorough-going defense of
minority interests against the arbitrary exercise of pov1er by the
majority; and the correlative doctrine of nullification served as
the justification of the vehicle for minority

protest~

The theory carried \·Tith it a concurrent veto, >·rhich Calhoun
first developed and defended in terms of the Constitution as it vras
interpreted in his day.

In. form, the question debated was state

versus national sovereignty; but in substance, it vras a struggle
-~

between a vested agricultural interest antedating the Revolution and a

i
grmving industrialism whose rise was predicated upon protection from
foreign competition.
Up to the time of the nullification controversy, Americans
had assumed >vithout becoming particularly technical about it,
that sovereignty in the United States was more or less equitably

-

divided bet-vmen state and federal governments.

i

This to Calhoun

>.;ras a contradiction in logic, for sovereignty implied supreme pov1er,
.

8

uncontrolled.

Since sovereignty could not be divided betv1een state

and federal government it must reside '"ith one or the other.
claimed the states ratified the Constitution, the states have

----·----7. Ibid., p. 37.
8. Ibid., p. 21.
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been sovereign and equal.

The Constitution >·Tas therefore a compact

betw·een equals and could not create a

ne~v

entity, superior to the

compacting parties.
The parts are the units, and the w·hole the multiple,
instead of the whole being a unit and the parts the factions.
The federal union exercised a portion of sovereignty, >-<ithout possessing the whole of it, ~·7hich even the nationalists
9
did not claim.
During the period of controversy over the tariff ·and the Force
Bill, Calhoun identified the concurrent majority with the constitutionalmaking pm•7er, and held the subsidiary:

law-making pm-1er to be the

function of the absolute or numerical majority.

10

He

'1-JaS

arguing

from the Constitution, so he phrased his case in language suited to
the purpose.

In the D_isquisition, ho>vever, he argued that the con-

current majority must be unanimous, a majority of those associated
with each interest concerned.

11

The apparent discrepancy is due to

the form in which, for practical purposes, the earlier argument was
cast.

Although he contended that the states were the funda.inental

units concerned,' he >vas thinking in terms of interests
not confined to single states.

"~<lhich

\vE>re

By dropping the geographical boundar-

ies, Calhoun was free to express his vie>·ls in more universal terms.
The distinction dra\vn bet>veen governments >·ms not of the one, the
fe>·T, the many, but bet\veen absolute and constitutiona1.

12

Any interest

6oulc1 be its negative block to all action tending to enrich others at
its expense.

Compromise was the great conserving principle of

9. Ibid., p. 68.
10. Anderson, op. cit., p. 9.
11. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 25.
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constitutional governments.
Calhoun felt political order which did not deal explicitly
with the diversity of groups would fail:
The human race is not comprehended in a single society
or community. The limited faculties of man, the great diversity
of language, customs, pursuit·s, situation and complexion,
and the difficulty of intercourse ••• have ••• harmed a great many
separate communities acU.ng independently of each other.
Between these there is the same tendency to conflict~,and:
from the same constitution of our nature, .as be.t.ween.
men individually; and even stronger •••• Self-preservation
13
i.s the supreme law, as 1;.1ell with communities as individuals.
An enduring political order, Calhoun realistically argued,
must be built upon the facts of matt's self-oriented wants and desires,
upon the circumstances of the diversity and conflict of social groups,
and, further, upon the complex dependence of the individual on society.
In vievT of these facts, as Calhoun saw them, the need for
political order '·ms clear.

It was needed, first to supplant w·ith

the benefits of unity the discord and confusion produced by the
diversity of individuals and their motives.

Second, it \•las required

to replace group bias and conflict by social harmony.

And, finally,

political order was essential for relating man tc.society in such a
way that his dependence upon it for his very existence and progress
'Vlould be maintained.

Calhoun smv the need for political order. in

his realistic observation that the disparate motivation of individuals
in relation to society and the diversity of group purposes in society
tend to produce that anarchy and conflict which might destroy man
and possibly his achievements; thus politi.cal order -v1as inevitable.

13. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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11

There is no difficulty in forming government •••• Necessity wiil force

it on all communities in some one form or another."

14

.When considering the problems of order and power, Calhoun noted
that man enjoys a claim to liberty based upon the natural "impulse
of ind:i.viduals to better their conditions. 1115
liberty and security are :i.ndispensable.u
premise at work:

"For this purpose,

16 Here then is the possessive

the right legitimating activity is viewed as implicit

1.n the naturalness of the impulse out of which such activHy arises.
At the same time, natural diversity is a condition of mankind, "as
:f.ndividuals differed greatly from one anothero 11

17

Such diversity

creates discont:i.nuities among the interest of men, i.e., '\'lith regard
to property, there was "a corresponding inequality between those who
may possess and those who may be deficient in them. rr
the psychological premise:

18

Next w·e note

"The tendency to a un:!.versal state of

conflict between individual and individual," since in response
to the "const5.tution of our nature ... .,each ••• is ready to sacrifice
the interest of others to his own., 1119
In the

Dis9£t~Jti_~

(though not in the Exposition) Calhoun

avo1.ded the expression "selfish feelings" because,

11

as commonly used,

it causes an inference of something depraved and vicious.u
Calhoun however., "selfish" did not connote vice.

° For

2

Like the framers of

the Constituti.on, Calhoun recognized that man's nature remained unchanged by change of condition ..

SelHshness was one of the facts of
--

u~.

Ibid., p. 8.

15. Ibid .. , p .. 40.

16. Ibid., p .. 41.

17. Ibid., p. 25.

18. Ibid., p .. 5.

19. Ibid .. , p .. 6.

20. Ibid., p. 4 ..
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the '1-lOrld and part of that science which would explain the world.

Given

the discontinuties among the· interest different men pursue, and in
light of our nature, conflict was inevitable and would
If not prevented by some controlling po'I-Ter, end
in a state of universal discord and conflict destructive
of the sozial state and the ends for 'vhich it is
ordained.
Complententing the problems of order in teaching the pluralist
to fear the liberty he is impelled to affirm, is the problem of
pmver.

For those very forces promoting the necessity of government,

i;e., of an external "controlling pov1er 11 capable of obtaining an
orderly consent to the difficulty of meeting t;.he tests of legitimacy.
For does not government imply governors?

And ,.,hat then l¥ill prevent:

the governors, Hho are after all only ordinary men, from advancing
against the tinerest and liberty of the governed?

Since all men feel

v1hat affects them more strongly than v1hat affects others, and since
the enjoyment of right, the safety of interest, requires a' containment
of conflict vThich only the exertion of controlling pmver can effect,
neither the placing of governors over: governors nor the v1eakening of
government itself promised to be adequate solutions to the problem.

22

Granted that i t is posstble by the device of the suffrage to transform
"irresponsible rulers" into "true and faithful respresentatives of

-

E

those who elect them, 11 :still political responsibility can only protect
a portion of the governed by transferring control over the governors
to t h e governe d •

23

As long as the community is divided among a number

21. Ibid., p. 5.

22.

Ibid~,

pp.

8~10.

23. Ibid., p. 12.
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of different interests unequally affected by the acts of government,
interest will contend to gain its control in order to advance their o'l'm
"isms" before the rights of others.

Nan's finite capacities and great

diversities, and other cauees, lead to the formation of independent
cormnunities.

24

For .Calhoun, as for Publius, it v;ras "a sort of

a~dom

in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of situation, constituted nations
natura 1

.

enem~es.

,,25

Political responsibility, implemented by the representative
principle, only serves to shift the axis of contention from one
between governors and governed to one bet,.;een the governing portion
of the citizen-body and the governed portion.

In the first case the

likelihood is great that the fe,., would abuse the rights of the many,

. t h e secon d case t h e reverse 1s
.
wh ~"l e ~n

t

26
h e greater pro ba b"l"
~ 1ty.

Unrestrained rule of the many, however, is vim'led by Calhoun as
implying not only a threat to the liberty and

int<~rest

but to the very >·mllsprings of human· progress as ,.,ell.

of the few,
The rule of

the many must lead to an equalization of condition, particularly
with reference to the distribution of property in society.

Democracy,

in other '1-mrds, threatens to dissolve the gap consisting of the inequalities which separate society's leaders from its runners-up and
'I'Thich "gives to progress its greatest impulese 11

It is by virtue of

the efforts of leaders and followers to maintain and overcome this
gap that progressive change creates.

27

24. Ibid., p. 9.
25. Jacob E. Cooke, The Federalist (Cleveland:
Publishing Company, 1961), p·.. 33.
26. Calhoun, op. cit .. , pp. 13-15.
27. Ibid., p. 44.
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The problem of po•·Ter, in Calhoun's vie"'' can perhaps best be
formulated a.s follo\'ls:

Hm-1 can inequality (a prod for progress) be

maintained >'lithout denying the equal rights of all to strive to
advance?

The liberty informing the diversity of interes:t (read:

possessive) in society and serving as the prod to progress at the

.~

same time also permits the conflict and disorder \vhich acts "to
weaken the impulse of individuals to better their condition and
.
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t h ere b y retar d progress an d 1mprovement.

Hhere there is no govern-

ment or controlling pm'ler, there can be no progress, since there is
little security.

~lhere

irresponsible government exists, there can be

no progress because there is little if any liberty.

And 'vhere re-

sponsible or representative government obtains there can be little
progress since there is little prospect for the survival of diversity.
·Liberty and diversity, it >-Toulcl appear, enjoy a mutually reciprocal
causal relationship while functioning independently of one another as
requisites to progress.

Yet the efficacy of each is contingent upon

the existence of order.

Order requires the exercise of po'l'ler.,

the generation and exercise of pm'ler there

j_s

And in

entailed a logic that

denies to both liberty and diversity that opportun:i.ty to coexist
which is absolutely necessary to the natural progress of man; but
I:

this progress

1s

alone capable of justifying the util:i.ty of liberty

·an:l the pov1ers of government!

29

Before a consideration of the strategy of mechanistic balance
as the solution advanced in the pluralist vis:i.on to the twin problem

28. Ibid., p. 41.
29. Ibid., pp.

32-34~

i

I

l.lS

of order and povrer, one or

t'\-To

comments seem appropriate on the illogic

in Calhoun 1 s argt1ment as it bears upon the authenticity of his conservatism.
Calhoun contended man

~ras

born into the social state.

Belief

in the "state of individuality supposed to have existed prior to the
social and political state" is to him both "false and dangerous. 11
But

~·Thy

30

then, i.f inen are. born into the social state, and not descended

from the state of nature, do they seem to possess paramount interst
in a conflict in character unaffected by the fact of membership in a
common antecedent collective?

If men are social by nature, if they

acquire their purpose from society, -.;.;rhy do they place opposing interest,
hinting at a pre-existing individuality, before the common interest
informed by their membership in the same soc.iety?

In 'vbat -.;qhy is the

condition of Calhoun's society different fromthe classical liberals'
state of nature, in the vie\'1' of the common attributes and rights of
their inhabitants and the resulting need for government in both cases?
Calhoun may deny a state of individuality as existing both ethically and
causally prior to man's political obligation but he proceeds to argue
nonetheless along the lines of natural right and possessive individuality
when he takes up the subject of political authority.

Perhaps Calhoun's

umrilli.ngness to admit that natural rights exi·st for all men, black
and white, coupled \·lith his inability to escape that legacy of
voluntarism, instrumentalism, and social atomism so deeply embedded
in the American political culture, accounts for his rejecting the state
of nat"U re construct \•7hile arguing nonetheless as if he accepted the

30. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
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set of theoretical assumptions it represents.

Furthermore, the

effort to mask one 1 s liberal premises ·while striving. for conservative
conclusions capable of justifying a bourgcois-individualtst society's
most cherished values (liberty .and progress) must at times be viewed as
productive of embarrassing ironies, to say the least.

It must, for

example, seem rather curious to some that God should create society
for man v1hile failing to make man sufficiently socialbe.

Even more

curious, hO\·mver, must be the fact that \·rhi.le ordaining government for
the purpose of correcting this error, God should fail to endow those
upon whom this blessing is bestowed with those necessary virtues capable
of insuring that government may function to achieve its intended effect!
Even if man seems umrill:i.ng or incapable of harmonizing his
actions \·rith the interest of others, there are still valid grounds for
hope.

For the lavrs of nature themselves point to the efficacy of a

mechanistic consitutionalism as the means of achieving the non-directive
balance neeessary to remedy this defect.

31

The belief of pluralist

psychology that cettain constants and universal tendencies j_n human
behavior may be isolated and made to serve the task of constructing a
political order appropriate to man reflects the Ert.lightened faith that
the regularity of causes and of the pm•Ters of natural reason permitting
-

physical science may have their counterparts in the affairs of man.
Calhoun, ·who as a conservative should have little faith in the efficacy
of reason to sustain a manipulative science of human affairs, and even
less faith in one founded upon the mechanical assumptions of astronomy
as opposed to the organic principles of biology, nevertheless declared

31. C., B. NacPherson, Th.£_POlj.j_ical_Ihcor_y___9i._Pos.2_~~sive_
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (London: Oxford University Press,
1962), pp. 16-17.
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early in the Disquisition:
(

••• it is indispensable to understand correctly what
that constitution or lmv of our nature is in which government originates •••• vlithout this, it is as impossible to
lay any soltd foundation for the science of government as
it vmuld be to lay one for that of astronomy without a like
understandj.ng of that constitution or la~v of the material
'\vorld according to which the several bodies composing the solar
system mutually act on each ~~her and by which they are kept
in their respective spheres.
Constitt1tion is utilized here as indicating a principle of fundamental
regularity in which all motion originates, both in man's vmrld and
in the heavens.

It is this solid foundation of universal constants,

this rule of law in nature,. that makes possible the experimental
and manipulative sciences.

As a natural being, man is no•different

from the other elements of the universe; he too is subject to a law
of his ovm nature harmoniously related to the laws of process and
motion organizing the more inclusive nature of vrhich he is a part.
Because, Calhoun contended, man in motion is

11

subject to laws as

fixed as matter itself," there can be little reason to suppose that
politics and legislation are not themselves proper subjects for the
"High po-vrer of men which has effected such wonders '\·Then directed to
the lm.;s which control the material vrorld. 1133

11

The time '\·Till come •••

v1hen politj.cs and legislation vrill be considered as much a science as
astonomy and chemistry. 11

3l~

It is the function of

11the

science of government, 11 according

to Calhoun, to enlist on the side of man 1 s social feelings his stronger

32. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 3.
33. Anderson, op. cit., p. 165.

34. Ibid., p. 167.
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individual feelings and to
the

~1hole

u~ite the·t~To

in promoting the interest of

.
35
as the best way to promote the separate .interest of each. ·

The two orders of feel:tng are united \'lhen the most reliable of those
behavioral tendencies isolated by the pluralist's psychology are
..
36
,
mars h a 11 e d to sustain a Newtonian-inspire d uesign
o f ba ).ance.

The

recipe of language employed in Calhoun's solution for the problem of
power is strangely reminiscent of Madison's, and \'lithout any doubt
placed him in the mainstream of the American pluralist tradition.

Thus

Calhoun observes that there is only one v-my to prevent "any on-e.interest
or combination of interests from using the pm·1ers of government to
aggrandize itself at the expense of the others.''

37

A balance of

tension among the contending interests of society must be effected by
appropriately ordering government 1 s
11

11

mm interior structure:"

pmo1er can only be resisted by power ••• and tendency by tendency."

38

Those features in the interior structure of government capable
of rendering operative the much sought after balance compromise >vhich
Calhoun called the "constitutional" or "organism of government."

The

constitution stems the abuse and preserves the pmo1er of government, as
government in turn preserves and perfects society.

39

Specifically, the

35. Calhoun, op. cit., pp. 53-55.
36. Nax l,erner, Amer:i.ca as a Civilization (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 918.
37- Calhoun, op. cit., p. 20.

38. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
39. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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~ncludes

constitution

the democratic suffrage and a system of se-

parated powers allowing each. interest in the society a concurring
or veto power over legislation vitually affecting its own welfare.
The suffrage will suffice to protect the numerical majority.

But only

by making "the several departments the organs of the distinct interest
or portions of the community" and by clothing "each with a negative on
the others," can the separation of power be made to work its intended
effect of sustaining that balance necessary to keep the governors
responsible to the governed ll"ithout exposing one portion of the community
to the danger of abuse by.the others, e.g., Tariff of Abomination.

The

chief virtue of constitutional·government, i.e.,, of popular government
safeguarding the rights of the minorities by the devicH of.the concurrent
majority, is its ability, according to Calhoun, to combine greater
measures of power and liberty more perfectly with one another than
would be possible in either a pure democracy or an outright autocracy.
The former can only maximize liberty at the cost of the governmentalr
power necessitated by the problem of order.

Autocracy, on the other

hand, suppresses liberty as a necessary price for the power :i.t generates.
Power,·of course, is required by government if i.t is to preserve society;
but liberty is necessary as well for the progress in society that
perfects man.

Progres ~ hovwver, results only from the impulse of

individuals to better their mm lot.

This impulse will not be

translated into beneficial activity unless each man is left free to
pursue his ovm interest \vith the confidence ttThat he will not be
deprived of the fruits of his exertions. 1141
~----~·----

40.

Ibid~,

pp. 25-30.

41.

Ib~d.,

p. 40.
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majority is advanced as legitimately compelling cooperation among
anturally competitive men possessing discontinuous interests, so as
to permit an optimum measure of individual liberty without inhibiting
the generation of the necessary measure of power required by government for the preservation of society.
Here it might be appropriate to note certain inconsistencies
and ambituities incidental··to ·.Calhoun 1 s argument.

Calhoun defended

government as necessat:y to society in the light of the problem of
order because of the individual's ovm dependence on society for perfection.

This certainly .. suggests a conaervat5.ve perspective:

man 1 s

dependence upon submission to authority as necessary to the acquisition
of purpose and completion.

But the perfection \vhic.h Calhoun's incomplete

man can acquire only in society results not from the moral sustenance
provided by his encounters vTith corporate hierarchies,. but from the
technolpgical progress that comes only from the selfish impulse of
. d an d competJ:tlve
.' .
' d'1v1'dua 1 s to h ave more. L, 2
atom1ze
1n

In contending that constitutional government more perfectly
fulfills the ends for \'Thich government is ordained, Calhoun strikes a
theoretical posture that places him some\·7here on the continuum of
pluralist political engineering betv1een Adams and Hadison.

Like,

Adams, he matched up institutional and social cleavages vlith one
another rather than follmving Nadison 1 s strategy of arranging an intersection of institutional and interest group boundaries.

On the other

hand, Calhoun's system more closely approximated Nadison 1 s in its degree

42. Lerner, opo cit., p. 921.

..-
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of mechanistic complexity.

43

Like Madison, Calhoun spoke of

a large

number of interest and cominations composing society rather than of
the one, the fe\·T, and the many to which Adams referred.

Lf4

Calhoun

also relied much more heavily than Adams upon the reliability of
mechanistic process and the unintended consequences of spontaneous
individual activity to achieve the pluralist's much.sought after
political equilibrium .. (t.,itness Calhoun 1 s political strategies between

1828 and 1833).,

There was little room in his system, for example, for

the exercise of that measure of wisdom and independent judgment Adams
required of the President as the agency of balance in his tripartite
respresentative scheme or <·Thich was embodied in the actions of

Andrc~·T

Jackson during the tariff controversy of his first term as President.
Inasmuch as Calhoun is depicted by some as the champion of
tradition, community, and hierarchy in America, his political argument
provides an opportunity to test the assertion that the denial of the
public interest and of citizenship are implicity in American political
life; does such a denial follow logically from those elements bf the
pluralist vision already noted as present in a system of political
thought frequently cited by those defending the appropriateness of the
pluralist mode of political organization and conduct?
conservatism 1 August 0. Spain commented that

~y

On Calhoun 1 s supposed

rejecting the doctrine

of natural right, and by asserting in its stead that man can only
achieve moral perfection in political society, Calhoun irrevocably
"departed from the individualistic American. tradition" >'lith its

43. Russell B. Nye, This Almost Chosen Pe.£El_E;, (East Lansing:
:t-1ichigan State University Press,-·T966), p. 51.
44. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 44.
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"doctrinaire limitation and fixation of governmental functions,"
thereby triumphantly claiming "for American thought the heritage of

Greece. "45
.
t1e
1 mo d ern western wor ld f·rom ac1ent
_

In a similar vein

Clinton Rossiter has stated that central to Calhoun's "conservative"
philosophy are: "A flat assertion of the primacy of the community;
a completely non-Jeffersonian theory of liberty; 11 and !'a belief based.
upon his ovm understanding of the Southern way of life, in ·the organic

.
46
cellular structure of t h e goo d soc1.ety • 11
Nuch of Calhoun's writing at first glance might seem to support
these contentions.

There is, for example, Calhoun's antipathy tovmrd

the competitive and impersonal vrorld of the industrial North, his belief
in thE: inevitability of a stratified society imvhi.ch one portion of the
community progress from the labor of the less fortunate, his conviction
that i t was the responsibility of the exploiting class to care for the
\'relfare of those >vho populate the lm·Ter orders, and his confidence
that the slavery of the South, rather than the -vrage labor regime of
the North, provided the most humane >vay to organize the unavoidable
features of the human condition.

47

Indeed, Calhoun smr .the disorder

and class vrarfare of the North as the direct consequence of the atomized condition of -vmrkers w-hQ were made to suffere the neglect of
irresponsible employers.

In the South, on the other hand, such

tensions \'10t.tld be difficult to uncover.

The \·70rkers by virtue of their

slave status were integrated into an organic comn1unity governed by a
_.;_

__________
l~S.

(NevT York:

August 0. Spain, The Political Theory of John
Bookman Associates, 1951), pp. 94-95.

c.

Calhoun

L}6. Clinton Rossiter, The Conservative Tradition in America:
The Thankle~_?__ Pers~.§-~<?~ (He\•T York: Vintage Boolcs,"-Tii62), pp. 120-121.

47. Lerner, op. cit., pp. 924-925, 932.

123
tradition that safeguarded their general interests and welfare:
The Southern states are an aggregate, in fact, of
communities not of individuals. Every plantation is a
little community v1ith the master at its head \vho concentrates in himself the united interest of capital
and labor, of \vhich he is a common representative. These
small communities aggregated make the state in all,
while labor and capittlg are equally represented and
perfectly harmonized.
Indeed, such perfect unity and organi.c integration allm·md the South
to act as a balance between the hostile forces of labor and
in the North.

~apital

The benefits of the South's organic unity are seen then;

••• to extend beyond the limits of the South.. It makes
that section the balancer of the (constitutional) system;
the great conservative po'l<rer which prevents other portio!'l~
less fortunately constituted from rushing into conflict. ·.
Ultimately the atomized, individualistic, possessive, voluntarist,
and mechanistically organized North 1·muld have to look for stability
to the existence of the hierarchically and cellular structured, organically
cemented, and tradition-directed community of freemen and slaves in
the South.
Yet, not\'rithstanding these claims, and the evidence in the
vocabulary of the Disquisition, as ,,rell:as, of an anti-rationalist,
anti-individualist posture on Calhoun's part (e.g., see the amply use
he made of such terms as: ''harmony," "organism, 11

11

v1i sdom, 11 "providence,"

..
I"'
-

and "connnunity") a closer vie\'7 of his system does reveal a perspective
on the public interest and a view of citizenship that can only be
appreciated as reflecting '·That is thought to be most typical of the
liberal tradition:

the flight from community.

Against the background

of the theory of concurrence and the assumptions that inform it, Calhoun's

------------------48. Spain, op. cit., p. 239.
49. Richard N. Current, "John :::. C<1lhoun, Philosopher of Reaction,"
Antioch Review, 3 (June,l943), p. 230.
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cellularly

struct~red

organic. conununity dissolves into a collection of

mechanistically integrated bourgeois interests.

Thus, in proceeding to

shape and defend the mechanism of concurrence, Calhoun's chief end of
government is not the encouragement of restraint to :i.nsure order but
the protection of liberty to insure progress; that society is composed
not of organically related estates possessing original and inherent
rights and purposes of their own but of competitive and clashing interests
belonging to status anxious individuals; and that the most appropriate
means for achieving public order is not an appeal to the corporative
loyalty of all but to the private interest of each.
Calho·un believed that the anarchy of conflicting forces which
man faces in his individual and social life inevitably forces an appeal
to principle.

In such circumstances, man's essential relation to the

ideal Has a matter of necessity not of choice.

Human power must be put

at the disposal of the political order "'hich such an appeal to
priPciple establishes, because man has not other recourse in the circumstances of hts life. 5°

Yet Calhoun had no illusion that the

exercise of power in this '"ay "rould as inevitably tend toward actual
justice.

Quite the contrary, the power placed at the disposal of

the government ,.Jill, he argued, normally be subordinated to the ends
of some individuals and groups at the expense of otherse

51

The appeal

to political principle will not prevail and the established political

order will not endure and be effective, unless both are rooted deep in
the reaU.stic circumstances of their origin.

50. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 8.
5J.e

Ibi~.,

Po 10.

An enduring political order
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must be so constituted ao to accord to the 1.ndividual his rights,
and to protect those social groups, minority and majority, which make
it possible

f~r

the individual to live and progress:

••• it (United States) must discover '·That the South
already was discovering, that numerical democracy, unrestrained by constitutional limitations on its will, is
no friend to political justice~ The crucial test of
every government is the measure of protection afforded
its '"eakest citizen; and judged by this test or democratic
state, \·Then power has come to be centraliz52 in few hands,
may prove to be no other than a tyrant- ....
Enduring justice, he said, can he maintained only when men come to
understand that the true principle of politi.cal order is a unity which
preserves the integrity of the individual and the minority, and only
when men will accept the full responsibility of their understanding.
Then and then only 'l'lill ideal pr:i.nciple prevail and become a living
and endurj.ng party of reaHty ..

53

·Calhoun's discussion of the sense of the community and the
common good noted:
.. ~·.the voice of the people -- uttered under the necessity
of avoidlng the greatest of calamities through the organs of
a government so constructed as to suppress the expression

of all partial and selfish interest, and to give full and·
faithful utterance to the sense of the \'Thole community,
in reference to the common we~!are -- may, without impiety,
be called 'the voice of God.' • ·
But what is this sense of the "whole community" of which Calhoun spoke
55
other than "the sense of all its parts?" ·

And how else was this

sense taken apart from the veto power of the system of concurrence
granted to those partial and selfish interest which Calhoun asserted

(London:

52. Vernon Farrington, Ma~in Currents in American Thought, III
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1927), 304.

53.

Calhoun, opo cit., p. 45.

54. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
Ibido, P• 29.
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are in opposition to the

11

counnon welfare? 11

It is this mutual negative among its various conflicting interests which invests each with the power of protecting itself, and places the rights and safety of each
where only thgg can be surely placed, under its own
guardianship.
Rather than a product of education or leadership, the public interest
is little more than the summing of private interests, little more
than the result of a mechanistically guided process of negotiation and
compromise mobilizing the private interests rather than the public
loyalties and ci.vic capacities of man.
If the connnunity interest was only the sum of those interests
that existed prior to and independent of the mechanism through which
the common good found expression, and the mechanism in question here
functioned only to safeguard those same private interests, then·
obviously the individ\.1al could never he integrated into the community.
in the way Calhoun intimated was possible in his idyllic plantation
model of political society.

In terms of the concepts, processes, and

ends Calhoun offered, there simply was no interior life to be shared,
no common integrating vantage point to which all men could repair to
assess the relevance of their varied interests to their own lives
considered as independent and unified wholes capable of benefiting
from the experiences and criticisms of other whole men.

Citizenship

in Calhoun's commt,tnity was less a matter of moral growth and contribution
to the common life than a mode of self justifying pressure group
activity (i.eo, pressure
group activity):

56. Ibid., p. 28.

group activity in behalf of pressure
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By giving to each interest, or portion, the
power of self protection, all strife and struggle
for ascendency is prevented, and thereby not only every
feeling calculated to weaken the attachment to the
whole is suppressed, but the individual and social
feelings are made to united in one conmon devotion
to country. Each sees and feels that it can best
promote its own properity by conciliating the good
l'lill and promoting the prosperity of others ••• the interests
of each would be merged in;the common interests of the
whole ••• and hence instead of faction, strife, and struggle
for party ascendency, there would be partriotism,
nationaHsm, harmony, and a struggle only g~r supremacy
in promoting the common good of the whole.
Thus do Calhoun's conservative values follow after his
denial of community?

It was only because the mechanism of the

concurrent majority provided an effective means for the defense of
special (i.e., private) interests, that attachment to the common
good (i.e., to the defense of the private interests
possible..

of all) was

Only because the mechanism of concurrence required a

wilHngness to compromise if men wished to advance .their own
independent purposes, was one able to call into being the censervat-f.ve properities of "Harmony, unanimity, and devotion to country, 11

58

To speak of citizenship in terms of devotion to country in
the context Calhoun did rai.sed some important difficulties.

For i f

citizenship consisted of the participation of equals in the ordering
of the common

life~

there was little opportunity for citizenshj.p ln

the pluralist soc:f.ety.

The pluralist vision denies the reality of a

commori life outside the ambit of political organization engineered
to mobil:l.ze and balance hostile interests, not conmon ones, private
motives, not public ones.

Thus as a concept standing for membership

status in the whole, citizenship was without

58. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

a

corresponding reality
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in the pluralist society.

Citizenship in the pluralist society,

in fact, could be little more than selfishness masquerading as civic
virtue.

By denying the existence of an independent and concrete

unifying public, the pluralist separates citizenship from membership
in political community and thereby disengages it from politics as
well.

One is then ultimately confronted not only 't>7ith a

publ~c

interest that divides rather than unites, but by an order in which
the pursuit of private advantage is looked upon as the foundation of
good citizenship.

Citizenship in this "unpublic 11 is the pursuit of

interests one possesses independent from the whole through institutions
belonging to the whole.

The pluralist citizens' involvement in the

public is inseparable from his flight from the public.

But the real

paradox is that this fHght from what divides men does not bring them
closer together but merely serves to perpetuate and.strengthen their
relatiot1s as strangers and potential rivals.

The amb:i.guities of

i

citizenship and the public interest are the consequences of the possessive
individualist, psychological and mechanistic perspectives of the
pluralist vision.·
Calhoun formulated and offered to the American people a
political philosophy which sought to relate political unity to the
diverse productions of human force and aspiration, the complexity of
contrary and conflicting movements and intentions which in fact
constituted American life..

He sought to incorporate these rea.Hties

into an expression of American political meaning;. he argued for the
uniqueness of regions, for the reights of sections, for the integrity
of diverse classes and groups, for the sancti.ty of the individual, and,

1:'

.i

I
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through these only, for the attainment of political unity.

Calhoun

urged that the various aspects of society be made the mechanism for
the expression of political significance of life in America.

He

envisioned the ideal unity of a nation incorporating a diversity of
individualist motive, a complexity of sectional aspiration, a variety
of parties and group interests bound together so that "every interest
will be truly and fully represented. 11

-----------------
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CHAP'.fER VI

STRATEGY:

PLURAJ~ISM

The principles which Calhoun called -·· rather
obscu1:ely -- 'the rule of concurrent majority, 1 has
become the organiz~ng principle (pluralism) of
American politics ....
Pet:er Drucker

The unsettled nature of a transition period renders it a
particularly felicitous time to study poliUcs.

Politics in a

period of change is particularly valuable because it forces persons
to ponder the fundamentals of a system whose institutions and practices
they could easily take for granted in more placid times$

To acknOi'l'-

ledge the necessity for our political institutions to adjust to
change is not enough.

we

must also consider how far this change

can go "t>Tithout threatening our basic poHtical traditions:

What

is permanent within our political tradition and what is transitory?
What is fundamental and what is contingent upon a particular time,
economcy, culture, or ethnic group?

What must be retained at all

costs and what can be sloughed off?

A delicate sense of discrimination

is involved in such a choice since men, carried a\>1ay by the passions
of the moment or lulled by familiartiy of accustomed practice, often
confuse the permanent with the temporary.

___________ _____
,_,

1. Peter Drucker, "A Key to American Politics: Calhoun's
Pluralism, 11 ·The Review of_toli~, X (October, 1948), 413.

-

;:

i
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Pluralism as a political process has recommended itself as
a mode of organizing and reflecting a fluid society:

in its capacity

to reflect the diversity of man, in its capacity of working toward a
more amenable solution of societies conflicts.

The feud hetween the

"House of Have 11 and "House of Want" for political and economic power
and order is as old as social union and can never be entirely quieted.
The negative pluralism (Perrow) provides a way of looking at things
politically congenial to individualist yet group-structured, interestmotivated, and mechanistically asserted anti-majori.tarian mode of
political life.

Calhoun's political rhetoric and practical

reveal basic tenets of this

process~

st~ategies

Pluralism as a process dealing

with change, is more of relations than just structures, and of
consequences more than just causes$

The theory and practice tends

to assume the existence of multi.ple centers of po·wer, none of which
is t-Tholly sovereign.

Each will. help::. to tame power, to secure the

consent of all, and to settle conflicts peacefully.,
Strategically the process involves channels of interaction to
help dispurse intensity and allow, as well as accomodate, diversity.
In one sense, he \·Tho acts in a pow·erful political process and views
decisions as interim, relative, conceives of a perpetual state of
unresolved conflict with decisions being partial resolutions of
conflict.

The majority does not rule, a majority decision is simply

a setting of the time under·.t-1hich the m:l.nority continues the discussion
\V'hich presumably goes on forever.

It is to this type of process

Jefferson's philosophy became entangled with the tariff situation.
The ph:i.losophy of state rights, nullification, and consequently

-----------
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concurrent majority -vras used to rationalize practices that would
otherwise be difficult to

justify~

Were the weighting of the vote and

the denial of political equality alien or subversive?

The defenders

of the system could convincingly deny this, and rather, claim that, in
supporting the rights of the minori.ty, they were protecting the
individual liberties which were the cornerstone of American political
belief.

\-las this static system an impractical retreat before the

leading social and economic forces of the time?

No, according to the

tl1eory, it was a. realistically Structured politics, keyed to actual

economic interests and geographic areas, rather than one based upon
an abstract w·orld of perfectly equal individuals.,

Calhoun thus

proclaimed that he was in the mainstream of the American political
tradition ..
While Andre>-T Jackson 1 s basic premise was egalitarian, Calhoun
followed a more anti-majoritarian theory.

Within the tradition of

Madison's pluralism, Calhoun visualized American society being composed
of groups or localities of varying sizes, and considered the main aim
of the political process was to achieve a consensus among them rather
than to reflect the will of an abstract majority of single individuals.
Calhoun's pluralism

respo~ds

to five of the general propositions Kariel

saw intregal to the study of pluralism:

small governmental units; power

dispersed; number of voluntary, independent associations; public policy
b;.nding on all assoc:l.ations as result of their own free interaction; and,
public government obliged to discern and act only upon common denomination
of group concurrence..

A weakness at the time was the lack of a

2
•
numb er o·f over 1app~ng
assoc :~.·
at~ons ..

But this apparently,

2. Henry Kariel, "l'luralism, 11 Inter~~io~sx_cloEe_dia of
.[9cial S_ci.e!:l~ (1967), XII, 165.
. .
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approach, no one group, or "factions'' in Madison's phraseology,
could dominate the government and exert its will over the others:
••• the struggle of interests is a safe, even energizing,
struggle which is compatible with, or even promotes, the
safety and stability of society •••• In a large commercial
society the interest of the many can be. frangmented into
many narrower, more limited interests ••• the mass will •••
seek small immediaje advantages for their narrow and
pecular interests.
w'here Aristotle has rested the preserva:tton of the balance
upon the maintenance of relative equality between the opposing forces,
Calhoun rested it upon the form of contract which gave to those who
are parties to it a right to oppose any infraction of one of their
number.

He moved from resolutions of conflict in the

11

removable

sphere'' of government to infringing upon the "fixed spheres. 11
Calhoun saw the country living simultaneously in a world of
Jefferson 1 s beliefs and in one of the realities of pragmatic politics$
Out of these two Calhoun's concept of
alone could make one viable whole.,

4

11

the rule of the concurrent majority"

The technique of concurrent veto,

exercised in a variety of forms by those special interests "'ould respond
to the lag between social or industrial changes and to the formal
changes in governmental structure which came slmvly.
Calhoun

sa~

in concurrent majority a basic principle of

free government:
Without this (thC:;\ rule of concurrent majority based on
interests rather than on principles) there can be ••• no
constitution. The assertion is true in reference to;aJ.l
constitutional governments, be their forms what they may:
It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the
constitut:i.on, -- and the positive which makes the
govellnmente The one is the power of acting; -- and

3e Cushing Strout, Intellectual His.tor,Y. in A.meric<!_, I
Harper and Rm·r,-1968) t ll.Oo

(New YOrk:

4. Drucker, op.

cit~,

p. 425.

. .'~
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the other the power of preventing or arresting action.
The two, combined, make constitutional government ..
• • • it follo.,;s, necessarily, that where the numerical
majority has the sol~ control of the government, there can
be no constitution ••• and hence, the numerical, unmixed with
the concurrent majority, necessarily forms, in all cases,
absolute government •
.... The principle by which they (governments) are upheld
and preserved ••• in constitutional governmen;s in compromise;
--rand in absolute governments is force ••••
As a pluralist, Calhoun dealt with the necessity of multiple
centers of sovereign power rather than one.
of pluralism was to tame power..
are

defined~:

He sa)" one. function

Pluralistic political patterns

to increase the levels through which an :i.ndividual or

group may enter the political arena and plead his ( it.s) case, as
well as limiting the degree of power which any one group or individual
may hold.

Calhoun strategically sought out every avenue provided by

the pluralistic framew·ork to rectify an in1balance in the distribution

of national resources.
Calhoun's rhetoric and strategies symbolized the subtle
differences of philosophical positions he held from Jackson.
Jefferson's inherited political philosophy was employed by each as
a strategic response to the tariff controversy.
veto

po-v:er

The constitutional

of the states over national legislation, by means of which

Calhoun proposed to formalize the principle of sectional and interest
compromise, has been.:.substituted in actual practice 't'lith a much more
powerful and much more elastic but extra-constitutlonal and extra- .
legal veto power of sections, interest and pressure groups in Congress
and within the parties.

c ..

But his basic principle itself:

that every

5., John c .. Calhoun~ ;!__!:?l:_sti~_?ition__2.!!..~Government_, ed,.
Gordon Post (Ne't'~ York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), ppb 35-37.

. major interest in the country, whether regional, economic or
religious, is to possess a veto power on political decisions directly
affecting it, the principle ,.,hich Calhoun called -- rather obscurely -"the rule of concurrent majority," has become the organizing principle
of American politics.

Sectional and interest pluralism has molded

all American political institutions.

It is the method -- entirely

unofficial and extra-constitutional -- through ,which the organs of
government are made to function, through vlhich leaders are selected,
policies are developed, men and groups are organized for the conquest
and management of political pm·mr.

The need for a formulated

foreign policy and for a national policy of industrial order is real -but not more so than the need for a real understanding of the
fundamental American fact that pluralism of sectional and interest
compromise is the warp of America's political fabric-- it cannot
be plucked out without unravelling the whole.
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APPENDIX.
CHRONOLOGY

176 7

Andre·w Jackson born

1782

John

1790

South Carolina Compromise

1798
1811

~ty.~)<J..

1815

Battle of New Orleans

1816

Prbtective Tariff

1817

Calhoun accepts position as

1819

Congress considers chastizement of Jackson for Seminole Affair

1821
1824

Calhoun declares himself a Presidential Candidate

1825

Calhoun inaugurated Vice President

1827

Calhoun broke tie in Senate to defeat Woolens Bill

1828

~_!.h

c.

Calhoun born

a_nd Virt;inia Re.s_9lutions
Calhoun elected to House of Representative·s

S~cretary

of War

Jackson defeated by Adams for position of President

Carolina Expo.sition and Protest circulated

Passage of Tariff of 1828 (Tariff of Abomination)
1829

Jackson inaugurated President
Calhoun inaugurated Vice President.
Jackson delievers first message to Congress

1830

Congress fails to_pass a Compromise Tariff
Jefferson Memorial Dinner

1831

Galhoun declares himself author of South Carolina Expos:i.tion and Protest
f.h!:_rokee vs

1832

Ge~

South Carolina drafts a Nullification Ordinance
Force Bill presented to Congress by Jackson

!i

Calhoun resigns as Vice President and accepts seat in United States sena!
1833

Congress approves the Force Bill
Compromise Tari.ff is passed
Nullification Ordinance is withdrawn

184-9

Calhoun completes

~quis.i_!:ion
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